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The corporate world has been satirized on the stage and pilloried in
the theatre, but for sheer drama little compares to the true-life scenes
played almost daily by an ever-changing cast of directors, officers,
shareholders, attorneys, investment bankers, and others engaged in pursuing or defeating hostile tender offers. 1 The conflicts created by such
offers provide a direct and highly visible confrontation between an
acquiror seeking support from target shareholders and an embattled
target management fearing the consequences of the takeover effort. 2
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1. References to the term "tender offer" denote a publicly announced and broadly
disseminated offer addressed to all shareholders of a particular corporation, referred to as
the "target corporation," to purchase shares of the target corporation at a stated price,
generally a premium over market, subject to stated time limitations and, often, minimum
'percentage tendering of shares. Payments are in the form of cash, securities, or a com·
bination thereof. The tender offer, made directly to shareholders, does not require
approval or any other formal action by the board of directors of the target corporation,
although approval may be sought as a means of inducing the tendering shares. Tender
offers may be for any percentage of a target corporation's shares, generally the offers
being for at least a sufficient number of shares to acquire working control of the target.
term "hostile tender offers" refers to those offers opposed by management of the
target corporation. Reference to "tender offer" in this Article is consistent with but not
necessarily limited to statutory interpretation of that term under the Williams Act, §§
l!l(d), (e), (f), 14(d), (e), (f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), (f), 78n(d), (e), (f) (1976); see note
8 infra. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 78!1, 817, 826-27, 829-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("class of shareholders protected," "tender offer," and "effort to gain
control'' defined).
2. Although negotiated mergers and tender offers are the normative means of effect·
a reorganization, contested tender offers comprised approximately 30% of all tender
in 1978 and approximately 20% of tender offers in 1979, there being, respectively,
annualized total of 166 and 112 interfirm tender offers during such years. Austin,
Offer Update: 1978-1979, 15 MERGERS & ACQ.UISITIONS, Summer 1980, at 13-14.
figures also indicate that 76% of contested tender offers in 1978 were at least parsuccessful, and 75% were in 1979. /d. at 18. The success rates appear misleading,
:llOWever, for they do not take into account inchoate efforts frustrated by pre-tender offer
tde£ensive tactics and thus never brought to public attention. See text accompanying notes
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Notorious contests in recent years include Occidental Petroleum-Mead
Corporation, Anderson Clayton-Gerber Products, Carter Hawley HaleMarshall Field, and American Express-McGraw-Hill. 3 Each of these confrontations resulted in target management causing the eventual withdrawal of the tender offer by employing a variety of defensive measures
known colloquially as "scorched earth" tactics.• Although potential
acquirors may be wary of entering upon so tumultuous a stage, the "urge
to merge" 5 among major corporations will continue to produce unsolicited, nonnegotiated tender offers at varying scales of size. 6
The hostile tender offer phenomenon has spawned wholesale defensive measures adopted by target company management. 7 Strategies and
16-17 infra. Moreover, the figures may not sufficiently include preliminary efforts that
were publicly announced but, prior to any actual offer, overwhelmed by a torrent of
defensive reactions. Austin's statistical table, for example, omits the highly contested,
unsuccessful effort of American Express to proceed with a tender offer for the shares of
McGraw-Hill. See note 97 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 80-81 and notes 59, 97 infra.
4. While target management may select among the defensive measures described in
Part I of this Article, it is not uncommon that management employs with immediate and
full force as many of such measures on a concurrent basis as may be plausibly justified.
Thus, litigation may be commenced at both federal and state levels, federal regulatory
agencies may be besieged with pleas for intercession, white knights sought, publicity campaigns undertaken, charter amendments proposed, and other measures initiated for the
purpose of keeping the potential acquiror off balance, on the defensive, and perhaps,
eventually enticed or required to withdraw. See notes 59, 97 infra. Employment of
numerous defensive measures on a concurrent basis is referred to within the investment
industry as "scorched earth" tactics.
5. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The Urge to
Merge-Where Has it Come From and Where is it Going?, 35 Bus. LAW. 1417, 1417
(1980). Mergers among companies having or creating a value in excess of $100 million
grew from 14 in 1975, 41 in 1977, 80 in 1978 to over 90 in 1979. I d. at 1429.
6. Often an unsolicited tender offer proceeds with the concurrence of target management, a concurrence whose enthusiasm may range from genuine to grudging depending upon management's view of its ability to influence the outcome of the tender offer
and its future role in the acquired company. Occasionally an initial position of
antagonism by target management is altered by sweetened packages, including a higher
offering price and perhaps commitments for continuing employment of the target's prin·,
cipal officers. Magnavox's opposition to the tender offer by T.M.C. Development Cor·
poration, a subsidiary of North American Phillips Corporation, was expressed to stock·
holders in terms of "the inadequacy of the offer of $8 per share in relationship to a book
value in excess of $11.00." Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977). Such'
opposition was dropped after agreement by North American to employment contracts for
16 Magnavox officers, despite the fact that the tender offer price was raised only to $9, ,
still well below book value. Id.
7. The phenomenon has also spawned a new form of insurance, underwritten
Lloyds of London, providing up to $1,000,000 for costs spent resisting hostile
offers. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 564, at Y-1 Quly 30, 1980). Estimated costs
sizeable contests are $300,000-$400,000 for attorneys' fees, $100,000-$200,000
accountants, $200,000 for public relations, and $300,000-$400,000 for imfes1:m«mt,
bankers. Id. Reportedly, insurance benefits are not payable unless the tender offer is
cessfully resisted. Id. The existence of such insurance may create added impetus to
management's determination to employ defensive measures, for the substantial costs will
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techniques have been created at a pace faster than the process of litiga ·
tion, causing a discernible lag between the ingenuity of corporate
management and counsel to devise defensive measures and the ability of
courts to develop legal standards effectively addressed to this expanding
and novel area. The result is that analysis of the validity of such measures
is often mired in amorphous concepts derived from contexts substantially
different from the competing claims of management, investors, and
others affected by tender offer disputes. Arguments as to validity are frequently voiced under the rubric of "fiduciary duty," the old warhorse
whose unbridled breadth gives sustenance to innumerable claims. No less
ambiguous are arguments framed upon statutory provisions, including
such concepts as the "business judgment rule," " corporate democracy,"
and the effect of standards set by the Williams Act and regulations
thereunder. 8 An alternative basis for evaluation relies upon economic
analysis of corporate and shareholder interests. Here too, however, an
aura of reason fades in the tangle of conflicting positions utilizing independent economic theories and goals.
The predictable result of reliance upon expansive, ill-defined, and
perhaps indefinable concepts is a lack of cohesive standards by which
defensive measures undertaken by target management are judged. Broad
perspectives such as fiduciary or statutory concepts have been wholly
inadequate as a means to develop meaningful standards by which to
evaluate specific measures. Such inadequacy is strikingly revealed by the
espousal of the broad concepts noted by both target management
defending antitakeover tactics and disgruntled shareholders reacting to
the lost opportunity of a premium sale.
The pattern of case law to date is consistent with the lack of definitive
standards. In the profusion of nebulous and conflicting standards, courts
have been reluctant to find target management liability or to enjoin certain measures except in egregious circumstances where defensive actions
blatantly defy any justification other than the self-perpetuation of incumbent management. The relative ease by which management may create a

iciently include preliminary efforts that
11al offer, overwhelmed by a torrent of
'~'example, omits the highly contested,
~ with a tender offer for the shares of

notes 59, 97 infra.
tong the defensive measures described in
magement employs with immediate and
rrent basis as may be plausibly justified.
leral and state levels, federal regulatory
on, white knights sought, publicity earned, and other measures initiated for the
Nllance, on the defensive, and perhaps,
ee notes 59, 97 infra. Employment of
•asis is referred to within the investment

king and Business Law, The Urge to
iS it Going?, 35 Bus. LAW. 1417, 1417
eat1ng a value in excess of $100 million
:over 90 in 1979. ld. at 1429.
ds with the concurrence of target man:ange from genuine to grudging dependRuence the outcome of the tender offer ,
y. Occasionally an initial position of
sweetened packages, including a higher
.tinuing employment of the target's prin·
c;ler offer by T.M.C. Development Corips Corporation, was expressed to stock·
of $8 per share in relationship to a book
:0., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977). Such
h American to employment contracts for
tender offer price was raised only to $9,

n

form of insurance. underwritten by
I for costs spent resisting hostile tender
Y-1 Quly 30, 1980). Estimated costs for
attorneys' fees, $100,000-$200,000 for
md $300,000-$400,000 for investment,
10t payable unless the tender offer is sucliUI'ance may create added impetus to
>e measures, for the substantial costs will

477

be borne either by the insurance carrier or the acquiring company depending upon the
outcome. Questions may arise about what constitutes "successful resistance," particularly
if tender offers are frustrated but subsequent derivative actions result in damage awards
against target management.
8. Williams Act, §§ 13(d), (e), (f), 14(d), (e), (f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d),
(e), (f) (1976). The Williams Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding
§§ 13(d), (e) and 14(d), (e), (f). The statutory provisions and regulations thereunder
require the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of documents by
an entity, person, or group acquiring more than 5% beneficial interest in a corporation
or intending to make a tender offer that may result in obtaining more than 5% of a
class of equity securities, the filing to include information as to the identity and
background of the acquiror, source of funds, relationships with the target corporation,
and any plans for future merger, reorganization, or other material use of the target's
assets or change in the target's board of directors. /d. § 78m(d)(1), (e). General antifraud
considerations covering activities of both the tender offeror and target corporation are
contained in § 14(e).
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patina of legitimacy for defensive measures results in even further constriction of judicial relief. The recent district court decision in Panter v.
Marshall Field (I Co. 9 is representative of judicial myopia in this area. As
more fully discussed below, 10 the court's dismissal of the shareholder
complaint against management's successful blocking of the Carter
Hawley Hale tender offer was laced with imposing references to fiduciary
obligations and business judgment concepts. Yet the opinion of the court
is one of homage without substance, for there is a marked lack of evaluation of the fundamental question whether a business- as opposed to a
survival-judgment was in fact made, or whether the judgment made
was based upon adequate consideration of relevant facts. 11
Panter, unfortunately, is not aberrational. The Second Circuit's
recent decision in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 12 reflects a similar
eagerness to- embrace a business judgment standard despite a lower
·court's explicit findings that target management's actions created
unusual and deleterious effects upon the corporation and minority
stockholders. 15 Until standards for control battles are more sharply
delineated, one cannot expect courts, with occasional exception, to be
other than inadequate arbiters of competing interests, routinely endorsing
and thus perpetuating the confusing maze of contradictory rationales.
Identifying appropriate and feasible standards for evaluating defensive
measures goes beyond creating a framework for judicial response. Inherent
in such an exercise is determining a formula for according priorities and
limitations among the competing rights, obligations, and interests of
management, shareholders, and the corporate entity}•
The ambiguities inherent in current perspectives might be substantially reduced if attention is focused on the nature and effect of the
tender offer, analogizing a successful tender offer to the sale of control by
a single or otherwise controlling shareholder. The owner of a fractional
percentage of shares who joins with others in the collective sale of control
in the tender offer context should be subject to no greater limitations
upon transferability decisions than is the fifty-one percent owner who
9. 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1389 (7th Cir. Mar.
24, 1980). Notwithstanding eventual disposition, the factual context is illustrative and the
district court's treatment of such issues as fiduciary duty and business judgment is indica·
tive of the lack of clarity and direction within these standards.
10. See text accompanying notes 87, 121-24 z"nfra.
11. See note 124 z"nfra.
12. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,603 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. See notes 107, 112 'infra.
14. The standards and perspectives proposed in this Article may appropriately be
adopted at the judicial level without imposition of statutory or administrative controls.
The proposals have accordingly been directed towards a judicial response, although no
inference is intended that legislative or regulatory intervention consistent with such stan·
dards should necessarily be avoided. As a matter of preference, it appears that the tender
offer context contains complexities and variables more appropriately suited for judicial
evaluation than the mandatory application of potentially inflexible rules.
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must be cognizant of corporate concerns 15 but over whom management
generally has no control. Standards developed to protect the corporation
and minority shareholders from the potential dangers of an ill-advised
sale of control by a dominant shareholder may be equally appropriate
and sufficient to judge the wisdom of the potential sale of control by the
collective judgment of individual shareholders. Application of those standards supports certain defensive measures and denies or suggests
modifications of others, and in each instance the evaluation focuses
much more directly and accurately on the essential characteristics of
tender offers than do the analyses of currently employed concepts.
After briefly outlining principal defensive measures, Part I of this
Article will examine each of the fiduciary, statutory, and economic
perspectives generally advanced in tender offer struggles, focusing upon
the difficulties of employing such perspectives as a basis for evaluating
defensive measures. Part II will posit an alternative approach, analogizing the collective action of tendering shareholders to a sale of control by
a single, dominant shareholder. Specific defensive measures by target
management to impede the tender offer will be analyzed in the context
of the sale of control analogue.
PART I

A.

Defensive Measures by Target Management
1.

Preparatory Actions

The notoriety of hostile tender offers and the resulting unease of the
management of potential targets have created a welter of anticipatory
defensive measures. Indeed, corporate counsel uniformly advise that when
directors and officers conclude that a reasonable possibility of an
unwanted tender offer exists, 16 defensive measures not wait until the wolf
is at the doorY This advice has sound tactical and legal justification.
Defensive measure,s that are first raised during a control· battle will often
15. See text accompanying notes 171-80 infra.
16. Factors relevant to such evaluation include size and extent of block holdings of
. shares, percentage of shares owned or controlled by management or those likely to side
with management, corporate liquidity, antitrust and regulatory matters, and similar
economic and strategic factors. For a description of such factors, see Hayes & Taussig,
Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 138; Troubh,
Characteristics of Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1301-04 (1977).
17. Forming a "team" to assist management in advance planning is discussed in
Small, Defending Target Companies-General Perspectives, 32 Bus. LAW. 1349, 1351-52
(1977). Advance planning is illustrated in Panter v. Marshall Field, 486 F. Supp. 1168
(N.D. Ill. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1389 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 1980), in which Marshall Field hired special counsel in 1969, 10 years prior to any tender offer effort, to advise
in the event of any takeover effort, with counsel thereafter attending each board of directors meeting. Id. at 1176-77.
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meet with substantially increased shareholder resistance and judicial
scrutiny. 18
Questions of validity are most sharply raised with regard to aggressive
antitakeover measures that attempt to create a porcupine-type defense not
dependent upon the hope that shareholders will reject the tender offer
either because of loyalty to, or the persuasive logic of, target manage·
ment. 19 Nonaggressive measures such as frequent communications to
shareholders, particular attention to holders of large blocks of targeted
shares, and respectable dividend policies generate a goodwill between
shareholders and management that may be of considerable help in com·
batting takeover efforts. Such measures, however, create far less impedi·
ment to both target shareholders and acquiring companies than do the
aggressive measures described below, and are often only an incidental
part of an expanded package of defensive tools.
Aggressive defensive measures are designed to impose substantial
tactical and administrative barriers to the pursuance of a hostile tender
offer. The following discussion briefly notes the more commonly adopted
measures, adopted individually or in various combinations.
Amendments to the articles of incorporation. A pervasive and potentially highly effective antitakeover device is the adoption of charter
amendments enlarging the defensive powers of target management and
making the corporation an unattractive takeover candidate. 20 Although
wide variations exist, the principal types of charter provisions sought by
18. Proxy statements for charter amendments to be adopted during the pendency of a
control fight will not only alert shareholders to their potential loss of premium in a
specific context (should the amendment pass), but will also involve much greater risks of
nondisclosure or misleading statements regarding the control issues. Compare, for example, the extensive disclosures in the April 18, 1979, proxy statement of Outdoor Sports
Industries, Inc., issued during an ongoing tender offer for the shares of OSI, with the
brief discussion contained in the December 15, 1978, proxy statement of Alberto-Culver
Company issued at a time of no pending or anticipated tender offer. Extracts of each of
the proxy statements are set forth in A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFER: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING 400-75 to 400-111 (1979).
19. Description of defensive measures in this Article is intended principally as a
background for discussion of the legal models used to determine justification. Comprehensive descriptions of the variety of available defensive measures are set forth in E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-76 (1973); E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR COR·
PORATECONTROL 193·206 (1977); A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 113-56; and 1M. LIP·
TON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 263-325 (1978). The defensive
measures discussed are applicable to cash tender offers. Where the offer is premised upon
an exchange of securities, additional measures based upon the quality of the security
offered, disclosure, and other securities law concerns may be taken. This Article will focus
principally, however, upon measures common to both cash and exchange offers.
20. Discussion of a wide variety of defensive charter provisions is found in Buford,
Amending the Corporate Charter, 32 Bus. LAW. 1353, 1353-56 (1977); Hochman &
Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537,
537-56 (1979); and Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAw. 1441, 1441-62 (1970).
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target management specify broad areas for board of directors' concerns,
increase the minimum vote required for mergers, and protect against
wholesale changes in board composition.
Charter provisions authorizing the board of directors to consider a
broad range of factors in determining whether to resist a hostile tender
offer are designed to legitimate and thus remove any questions regard' ing the breadth of management concerns that may justify defense reactions. Shareholders of MacDonald's Corporation were thus asked to
amend the corporation's articles to permit directors to consider such factors as "the social, legal and economic effect on franchises, employees,
suppliers, customers and business" in considering whether to resist tender
offers. 21 Management of Foremost-McKesson, concerned about the intentions of a substantial minority shareholder, obtained approval from
shareholders of an amendment authorizing the board to interfere with
stock purchases by "a person or persons determined to be unsuitable by
government authorities," and empowering the board to express views to
regulatory agencies on that subject. 22 Although such provisions may
technically be unnecessary in light of expanding notions of board responsibilities, 25 they remove questions of validity regarding indirect concerns
and offer support to board members who might be otherwise cautious of
blocking shareholder acceptance of favorable premium offers.
A second and potentially more impeding amendment requires a
supermajority vote of shareholders to approve a merger with any party that
has previously obtained a specified minimum percentage of shares. Supermajority provisions typically range from two-thirds to as much as ninety
percent, a higher figure often reflecting a relatively low percentage of
shares controlled by management and insiders. 24 As tender offers are frequently the first of a two-step process involving eventual merger of the
acquiring and target corporations, a substantial impediment to merger
may considerably reduce the risk of a hostile tender offer. To avoid the
supermajority impediment from later being amended down to a more
workable percentage, such provisions are frequently accompanied by the
further requirement that they cannot be amended or repealed except by
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21. Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1979, at 10, col. 2.
22. /d., July 24, 1980, at 25, col. 2.
23. See note 71 infra.
24. A two-thirds provision was proposed for MacDonalds. Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1979,
at 10, col. 2. A typical provision was adopted by Bell Industries, providing for an affirmative vote of at least 75% of Bell's shares to authorize a merger, consolidation, or sale of
assets with a "related entity," defined as a person or entity owning directly or indirectly
20% of Bell's voting securities. Id., Oct. 19, 1979, at 6, col. 2. An 80-10 combination is
also common, requiring 80% shareholder approval for merger with owners of 10% or
more of the target's shares. See Three More Companies Lay Plans to Impede Hostile
Tender Offers, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1979, at 14, col. 2. An example of a 90% provision is
described in Buford, Amending the Corporate Charter, 32 Bus. LAW. 1353, 1354 (1977).
F1eischer notes a variation that increases the vote requirement on a scale relative to an
increase in stock owned by the acquiring company. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 19.
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an equally high supermajority vote. 25 An additional related provision, to
assure that friendly or negotiated mergers do not face the difficult hurdle
of supermajority approval, permits approval of mergers by a simple majority vote if the board of directors has approved the merger prior to the
acquiring company's attainment of control of the board of directors.2 6
The consequent ability of the board to affect voting requirements has
survived challenge in at least two statesY However, the more fundamental question of adoption of a supermajority amendment through a simple
majority vote has not yet been directly addressed. zs
A third and frequent form of charter amendment provides for a
classified board of directors, thus delaying the ability of the acquiring
company to obtain majority control of the board. 29 The limitation could
be an extremely effective impediment where acquisition of control on a
near-term basis is important to the potential offeror, including situations
where the offeror intends to utilize assets of the target company to fund
the costs of acquisition.
Reincorporation. A majority of states have adopted statutes imposing
advance notice, filing, and other requirements upon potential acquirors of
target corporations incorporated, located in, or otherwise having substantial connections with the state. 50 Often referred to as antitakeover statutes,
25. Such restrictions may be superfluous, however, in some states that establish such
limitation by statute. Delaware's statute, for example, requires "such greater vote" to
alter, amend, or repeal a supermajority provision. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(4)
(Supp. 1978).
26. Again, variations abound. Some corporations may vest the waiver power in "continuing directors," that is, directors elected prior to the potential acquiror's acquisition of
shares. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 21-22 n.65.
27. Siebert v. Gulton, No. 79-5631 (Del. Ch., filed June 21, 1979), affd wz~hout
publ. opinion, 414 A.2d 822 (1980); Siebert v. Milton Bradley Co., 80 Mass. Adv. Sh.
1235, 1241, 405 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Mass. 1980).
28. See text accompanying notes 181-201 infra.
29. See Wendy$ Asks Holders to Approve Changes to Thwart Any "Raids," Wall St.
J., Apr. 14, 1980, at 35, col. 1. To assure that a successful tender offeror cannot remove
all directors and, through a special meeting, fill all vacancies at one stroke, it would be
necessary to provide by additional charter amendment that no directors may be removed
except for cause, or alternatively only by supermajority vote. Other protective measures
include a restriction against an increase in the size of the board, designated "alternate"
directors to fill vacancies, and limitations on shareholder meetings. See A. FLEISCHER,
supra note 18, at 14-18.
30. As of November 1980, tender offer statutes had been adopted in 35 states:
ALASKA STAT.§ 45.57.010-.120 (Michie 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.§§ 67-1264 to -1264.14
(1980); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
36-456 to -468m (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE
ANN.§§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT.§§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1980); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121~. § 137.5-1 (1977);
IND. CODE ANN.§§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE§§ 502.211 to .215
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974); KY. REV. STAT.§§ 292.560 to .630
(Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 51:1500 to:1512 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801 to 817 (Supp. 1980-1981); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.§
11-901 (Michie Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1 to 13 (West Supp.
1980-1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 451.901 to .917 (West Supp. 1980-1981); MINN.
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the legislation generally provides minimum time frames for advance notice
to state administrative authorities and to the target corporation, as well as
provisions for administrative hearings on the merits of the offer if opposed
by target management. 51 The notice and delay occasioned by such provisions offer important breathing space for target management, permitting
them to consider, prepare, and launch countermeasures to subvert the surprise offer. Moreover, there is always the chance that a state administrator will find the tender offer to be unfair, or will require additional and
possibly time-consuming disclosure. 32 Delay alone can be decisive. Consequently, such statutes become an important weapon in the arsenal of
defensive measures, and it is not uncommon to find corporations seeking
shareholder approval of reincorporation in states that have adopted such
statutes. 33 A major cloud on the validity of the various state statutes will,
however, remain until the Supreme Court resolves the preemption and
interstate commerce issues avoided by its jurisdictional decision in Leroy
v. Great Western United Corp.s.
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STAT. ANN.§§ 80B.01 to .13 (West Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 75-72-101 to -121
(Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376 to .3778 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 421-A:1 to :15 (Supp. 1979); N.J. REV. STAT.§§ 49:5-1 to :5-19 (West Supp.
1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§§ 1600-1614 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 78 B-1
to -11 (Michie Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 1707.041 (Supp. 1979); PA. CONS.
STAT. tit. 70, §§ 71 to 85 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 47-32-1
to -47 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 48-2101 to -2114 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN.§§
61-4-1 to -13 (1978); VA. CODE§§ 13.1-528 to -540 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT.§§ 552.01 to
.25 (West Supp. 1980).
31. See note 109 infra.
32. Price may be only one aspect of fairness, as statutory provisions often include
additional factors that may influence an administrator's determination. Louisiana, for
example, requires a finding that the potential acquisition "will provide a positive benefit
to this state, its citizens and its resources." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 51:1501G (West Supp.
1980). Presumably such a standard could lead to an injunction when the acquisition may
have--adverse impact upon employment, competition, or communities in which plants
may be closed or relocated. In United Technologies' tender offer for shares of Carrier
Corporation, the New York Attorney General, acting under the New York statute,
required a detailed description of what arrangements would be made to protect Carriers'
existing employee benefit plans, and the criteria United would use to determine whether
changes would be made in Carriers' present management and plant locations. In Re:
Takeover Bid by United Technologies for Carrier Corp. (letter dated Oct. 2, 1978, to
United Technologies from Louis Lefkowitz, Attorney General, State of New York), cited
in A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 56-2, n.139.
33. Bell Industries, for example, reincorporated in Delaware. Wall St. J., Oct. 19,
1979, at 6, col. 2.
34. 443 U.S. 173 (1979), rev'g on jurisdictional grounds, Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978). The preemption issue has had a checkered
history, state statutes having failed on preemption grounds in Connecticut, Hi-Shear
Indus., Inc. v. Neiditz, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,805, at 90,038 (D. Conn. 1980);
Illinois, Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 1980); Michigan, Kelley v. Beta
X Corp .. No. 46077 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); New Jersey, Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, C.A.
80-3770 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 1981); and South Carolina, Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,804, at 90,031 (D.S.C. 1980). Statutes have been sustained
in Ohio, AMCA lnt'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Delaware,
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Issuance of shares. Where insiders own or control an insufficient
number of shares to discourage tender offers, effort might be made to
place a sizeable block of shares in the hands of one or more parties who
may be expected to side with management in the event of a hostile
takeover effort. One avenue is the establishment of an Employee Stock
Ownership Trust (ESOT). Although formation of an ESOT concurrent
with opposition to a pending tender offer raises substantial questions of
whether the formation is serving a valid corporate purpose, 35 an ESOT
established well in advance of any potential offer may be free from
serious challenge and could result in a sizeable block of shares held by
trustees with inclinations favorable to management. Similarly, stock
dividends, 36 and stock bonus, purchase, and dividend reinvestment
plans, 37 aggrandize the percentage stock ownership of employees and
current stockholders who, it is anticipated, will constitute a group loyal
to management in the event of a takeover effort. Substantial numbers of
shares may also be issued by the target company through acquisitions or
mergers, thereby increasing the acquiror's cost of acquisition or creating
blocks of shares likely to support target management. 38
Repurchase of shares. If management owns or controls a substantial
percentage of shares, a repurchase program by the target corporation
may increase that percentage perhaps to the point that it acts as an effec-

I

Wylain v. TRE Corp .. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,270
(Del. Ch. 1980); Kentucky, Strode v. Esmark, Inc., FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,538
(Ky. 1980); and Virginia, Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980). The
SEC's recent adoption of rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1979), regarding the
commencement date of tender offers for Williams Act purposes appears to create direct
conflicts with advance notice provisions of state statutes. Based on this and other perceived conflicts, the SEC has concluded that state statutes "frustrate the operation and
purposes of the Williams Act." SEC Rei. No. 34-16384, Jan. 7, 1980, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 82,873. Decisions to date have regarded rule 14d-2 as preempting state provisions. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith (1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1
97,731, at 98,835 (3d Cir. 1980); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,389 (Del. 1980; Eure v. Grand
Metropolitan Ltd., FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,383 (N.C. 1980. See Langevoort, State
Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 213, 246-54 (1977).
35. In Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975), the court suggested
that an ESOT mi~ht be e~j~in_ed perm~nently fro~ voting or otherwise dealing with any
of the shares acqmred by It If Its establishment dunng a control fight would cause irreparable harm or would be a breach of management's fiduciary duties to minority shareholders. Id. at 234. Accord, Podesta v. Calumet Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. R~P. (CCH) 1 96,433, at 93,557 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("defendants adopted the
ESOP for the Improper purpose of retaining control by diluting the plaintiff's voting
strength").
36. See Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. The dividend reinvestment plan as a preparatory defensive measure is discussed
in Robinson, Strategy to Prevent a Takeover, 32 Bus. LAW. 1361, 1362 (1977).
38. Here, too, timing and appearance are critical. Acquisitions not concurrent or
reasonably close to a struggle for control may have a substantial chance of success
given the absence of facts inferring questionable motivation and the disinclination of
courts to interfere with business decisions.
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block against a hostile tender offer. 39 A recent decision by the Board
Marriott Corporation to authorize the repurchase of up to 3,100,000
'tott shares will result in increasing the Marriott family's control
24.7 to 36 percent of the common stock, thus effectively precluding
takeover efforts because of Marriott's requirement for two-thirds
lsannroval of mergers. •o Absent special charter provisions, repurchases do
require shareholder approval and therefore may not be subject to
disclosures regarding the effect of such programs upon slight but
shifts in the percentage ownership of insiders. n
Acquisition of regulated b'U.Stnesses. A common defensive measure
an unexpected offer is announced is to engage as many regulatory
agencies as possible in a consideration of antitrust and licensing conThus, potential targets may create administrative burdens, and
be less attractive, to the extent that their operations fall within
controls. Enlisting the aid of regulatory agencies is illustrated
McGraw-Hill's efforts to avoid an American Express tender offer.
!'.tUIIOng other defensive reactions, •z McGraw strenuously sought Federal
Commission (FCC) support to delay the offer pending
consideration regarding the effect of a transference of control upon
continued validity of McGraw's four television licenses. •a
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39. Repurchases may be undertaken for other defensive reasons, such as to
cause-through a reduction in outstanding shares-an increase in market price per share
or to buy out the holdings of a dissident group likely to side with a potential acquiror.
These purposes carry substantial legal and practical risks, however. A repurchase pro·
_
reduces the total number of shares necessary to acquire control, thereby reducing
the overall tender offer cost unless the target repurchases have materially increased
market price per share. In most cases a material rise in market price is unlikely, par·
ticularly in light of·antimanipulative provisions of the federal securities laws. See, e.g.,
(proposed) Rule 13e-2, SEC Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-10539 (Dec. 6, 1973) and
!14-17222 (Oct. 17, 1980). Purchase of shares from a select group of shareholders raises
tubstantial issues of corporate purpose and unequal treatment of shareholders, as well as
the possibility of precipitating a bidding war for such shares. Repurchases for defensive
purposes are therefore most effectively undertaken when they may effect significant
increases in the percentage holdings of management and other insiders. See Nathan &
Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus.
LAw. 1545, 1556 (1980).
40. Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1980, at 16, col. 3. Marriott had previously engaged in a
tender offer for 10,600,000 of its own shares, for which 7,500,000 shares were tendered.
The combined effect of the tender offer and repurchase program, when completed,
would increase insider holdings from 24.7% to 36% of the outstanding common stock.

Id.
41. Informal pressure for shareholder referendum may be brought to bear by
exchanges or other institutional forces. In Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch.
1977), the New York Stock Exchange advised that the proposed repurchase of a sizeable,
though noncontrolling, block of shares from a dissident shareholder should be submitted
for shareholder approval. !d. at 561. The Board acquiesced although it "did not feel that
legally this was necessary." !d.
42. See notes 59·, 97 infra.
43. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1979, at 8, col. 2. Shipping and communication regulations
formed a basis of General Host's efforts in 1973 to enjoin the tender offer of Triumph
American, despite the relatively insignificant aspects of those portions of General Host's
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Reduction i'n liquidity. Corporations may be attractive takeover can·
didates because of substantial liquid assets that may be used by acquirors to
fund the acquisitions or expansion of their own operations. It is not uncom·
mon for such candidates to deliberately reduce their charm through the ·
payment of cash dividends, cash acquisitions of companies or major assets,
and the premature retirement or redemption of debt and preferred
securities. ••
Restri'cti've provisions in loan agreements. Banks and other lending
institutions may be utilized as allies through provisions in loan
agreements requiring acceleration of loans in the event of any change in
control of the borrowing corporation. 45 Acceleration may cause a
substantial drain upon working capital of the target corporation, thus
giving pause to potential acquirors. Although new loans may be obtained
following accel~ration, interest rates and other lending provisions may
not be as favorable as at the date of the original loan. The limited
usefulness and questionable validity of such loan provisions, however,
have probably caused banks as well as borrowers generally to avoid their
adoption. 46
2.

Defensive Measures Concurrent wzth Announced or
Pending Tender Offers

The preparatory measures described above may also be initiated
during the pendency or imminence of a tender offer. Adoption of such
measures at a later date, however, may raise considerable legal questions
under "perpetuation of control" theories. Nevertheless, the ambiguity in
operations. General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 752
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); see note 235 infra. Some regulated industries may offer greater defen·
sive protection than others. One commentator has noted that "acquiring a small
insurance company can be very helpful because of the regulatory roadblock which can be
thrown up, no matter how insignificant a part of the business it may represent." R. JEN·
NINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 742-43 n.28 (4th ed. 1977).
44. Within five days of an announced tender offer by Schiavone & Sons, Inc. for the
shares of Corenco Corp., Corenco directors declared an extra cash dividend payable to
holders of record the day after the offer's stated expiration date. See Corenco Corp. v.
Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1973). See also City Investing to
Dispose of 1200 Million of Assets in Wake of Takeover Bid-Offer, Wall St. J., July 25,
1980, at 4, col. 2.
45. See Schmults & Kelly, Cash Takeover Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW.
115, 132 (1967). Certain loans of the Anaconda Company contained acceleration provisions "whenever more than 10 percent of the Anaconda voting stock was concentrated in ··
one person or entity." Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
46. Such loan provisions have been criticized as "a particularly shocking technique"
that "would also raise the possibility that the management be held liable for tying up the
company on a long-term basis." Cary, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management
from Attack, 25 Bus. LAW. 839, 841 (1970). Contra, Kamen, Special Problems of Institutional Lenders, 32 Bus. LAW. 1423 (1977), in which it is suggested that cases upholding
the acceleration of mortgage loans upon sale of the property may have analogous application to creditor interests in changes of management. /d. at 1425.
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standards for determining the validity of defensive measures, as discussed
below ,' 7 encourages the adoption of aggressive measures even in the
midst of a control struggle. Additional defensive techniques often
employed during a tender offer battle include the following:
Litigation. Immediate initiation of litigation seeking a preliminary
injunction against the tender offer proceeding has been almost a knee-jerk
reaction in hostile takeover situations. The suit often alleges a host of violations including failure to make filings under the Williams Act, inadequacy
of such filings, antitrust violations, obtaining funds in excess of statutory
borrowing restrictions,'8 rule IOb-5 violations, and whatever other claims
ingenious counsel for target management might devise. ' 9 Litigation offers
the attractive possibilities of time-consuming and broad discovery that
may open new avenues of attack, as well as the potentiality of a
preliminary injuncticm. Delay alone, whether created by litigation itself
or the entering of a preliminary injunction, may be decisive where the
acquiror is dependent upon a pending line of credit or other availability
of funding sources. 50
The two most fruitful grounds for litigation involve Williams Act
and antitrust concerns. The Williams Act provides a variety of potential
violations, ranging from technical filing requirements to broad disclosure
standards. 51 However, even if Williams Act violations are proven, victory
may be short-lived if the injunction is conditional on a particular filing or
disclosure correction. 52 Much more promising is the possibility of a longterm preliminary injunction based on a potential antitrust violation. The
scope and complexity of antitrust litigation also invites a broad range of
time-consuming discovery that may become enervating and eventually
too wasteful from the standpoint of the potential acquiror. 55 Moreover,
47. See notes 65-160 infra and accompanying text.
48. 15 u.s.c. § 78g (1976).
49. The commonality of litigation has caused one commentator to note that "almost
without exception, any announcement of a take-over bid is now instantly followed by an
injunction action filed by the corporate management charging the 'raider' with most of
the crimes in the Decalogue, but usually stopping short of statutory rape." R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 742 (4th ed. 1977).
50. Additi"onal advantages noted by a leading practitioner include the chilling of the
enthusiasm of arbitrageurs before substantial positions are acquired, creating breathing
space for target management's efforts to find a more suitable merger partner, and raising
the morale of an embattled target management. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437 (1977).
51. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1971) (failure to file
schedule 13D); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (formation of group and commencement of tender offer without required filings).
52. E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975) (corrective filing
of schedule 13D is sufficient relief in the absence of plaintiff establishing irreparable
harm caused by initial failure); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207,
215 (2d Cir. 1973) (permanent injunction denied when defects in schedule 14D
disclosures were corrected).
5!1. In issuing a preliminary injunction halting the tender offer of Paccar, Inc. for the
common shares of Hamischfeger Corporation, the trial judge acknowledged that the
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matters learned through discovery might become a basis for heightened
governmental concern or intervention. 5•
State tender offer statutes. Target management may receive
welcome assistance from local officials charged with enforcement of state
antitakeover statutes. For example, in the aborted effort by Occidental
Petroleum to go forward with a tender offer for Mead Corporation,
Mead gained valuable time and impetus when the Ohio Division of
Securities made an initial finding that Occidental had made inadequate
and misleading disclosures. As a result of the finding, Occidental could
not proceed with its offer until those disclosures had been corrected. 55
Defensive acquisitions. Timely acquisitions by target corporations
may bootstrap the target into an offensive litigating posture based upon
antitrust concerns. 56 The haste by which such acquisitions are made,
however, as well as the substantial suspicion necessarily raised as to bona
fides, create considerable risk of adverse judicial reaction. 57 The Panter
court, however, appeared untroubled by Marshall Field's eleventh hour
acquisition of stores in the Carter Hawley Hale marketing areas. 58
Publicity campaigns. Full page ads in national and regional

:'

injunction "might be fatal to the offer." Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1151, 1153 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
54. See Axinn, Tactics and Strategies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1527, 1531 (1977).
55. The delays obtained by Mead permitted it to undertake a wide range of defensive
activities that eventually resulted in Occidental's withdrawal. The Occidential-Mead
struggle is described in Hostl1e Merger Moves Meet Fierce Opposition from Target Con·
cerns, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1979, at I, col. 6. See note 59 infra.
56. Subsequent to the announced exchange offer by Crane to acquire 22.·6% .of the
common stock of Anaconda, Anaconda acquired a major competitor of Crane and sought.
a preliminary injunction against the offer, inter alia, upon antitrust grounds. Crane Co.
v. Anaconda Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court denied the
request for injunction, relying upon the investment exception provision of § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), as well as a perceived ability to "unravel the
situation" should that be necessary after a full trial on the merits. 411 F. Supp. at
1219-20.
57. Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH), 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Five days following the announced intention of
Monogram to make a tender offer for the shares of Royal, Royal negotiated and executed
an agreement for the acquisition of Sar Industries, a small but competing business of
Monogram's that was plaintiff in a pending antitrust action against Monogram. Id. at
91,134. The acquisition was totally a defensive maneuver designed solely to create an
antitrust block. At Monogram's instance the court enjoined the acquisition. Id. at 91,133.
The court regarded the transaction as a violation of§ 14(e) of the Williams Act, contrary
to the Act's presumed requirement that the tender offeror "has a right to a fair opportunity to compete for control of a target company." !d. at 91,136. The court also regarded
the acquisition as violating fiduciary standards of Delaware law. !d. The Williams Act
basis for the opinion has been undermined by post-Sante Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977), decisions limiting§ 14(e) to disclosure concerns. See In re Sunshine Mining Co.
Securities Litigation, 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods., 454
F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
58. See note 230 infra.
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ight become a basis for heightened

newspapers, press releases, and mailings to shareholders, brokers,
analysts, and others within the investment industry serve a two-fold purpose: one, to create a pause, hopefully of permanent duration, in the
shareholders' eagerness to embrace the premium being offered for their
shares, and second, to serve the potential acquiror with notice that it is in
for an arduous struggle. Although more relevant to exchange rather than
cash offers, a hard hitting publicity campaign seizes upon every actual or
contrived weakness of the acquiror, occasionally causing even the most
determined acquiror to consider whether the allegations and costs of
rebutting such campaigns are worth enduring. 59
Defensive mergers. If all other defensive measures appear or prove
to be inadequate against a determined adversary, target management
may seek a more suitable acquiror, presumably one that raises fewer concerns as to management tenure, use of target assets, and other effects of
shifting control. Rescuing acquirors, dubbed "white knights," may enter
the fray either by competing tender offers or by negotiated mergers subject to shareholder approval. 60 In either case, the effort is designed to
outbid or frustrate the unwanted tender offeror, although even "white
knights" have their limits and may not tolerate too many dark days of a
bidding war. 61
The foregoing discussion presents those defensive measures generally
the most aggressive and effective in forestalling, impeding, and perhaps
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59. When Occidental Petroleum initiated its takeover efforts of Mead Corporation,
Mead gathered enormous volumes of documents regarding Occidental's global activities
from the files of federal regulatory agencies as well as directly from Occidental. Wall St.
J., Apr. 3, 1979, at 39, col. 2. Mead's photocopying bill alone was approximately
$300,000. Id. The information obtained was then organized and disseminated to
numerous regulatory commissions in order to prompt or facilitate investigations of
Occidental's activities in the decade preceding the takeover bid. /d. at I, col. 6. During
the American Express battle for McGraw-Hill, the integrity of American Express was
challenged by McGraw-Hill's vociferous denunciation of the "conspiratorial" role of the
president of American Express who served on the board of directors of McGraw-Hill during the same period that American Express was planning its takeover attempt. /d., Jan.
16, 1979, at 5, col. I. A disclosure issue raised by Gerber Products against AndersonClayton was whether Anderson-Clayton had failed to sufficiently disclose illegal payments
to its employees in connection with foreign sales. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F.
Supp. 1310, 1314-16 (W.D. Mich. 1978). In particular, Gerber sought disclosure of the
identification and location of the employees involved in the illegal payments. /d. at 1315.
During the pendency of the action seeking an order for fuller disclosure, AndersonClayton withdrew its tender offer. /d. at 1316.
60. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), best
known for the Court's "pragmatic" approach to the interpretation of§ 16{b), arose out of
Old Kern's accomplishing a defensive merger with Tenneco after Occidental had already
acquired a substantial block of shares through a tender offer. /d. at 587.
61. Defensive efforts by Liggett Group to ward off a proposed cash tender offer by
Grand Metropolitan Ltd. included enticing a competing offer from Standard Brands,
Inc. Wall St. J., May 7, 1980, at 3, col. 2. The effort failed when Grand Metropolitan
increased its bid, and Standard Brand's "rescue" attempt was promptly withdrawn. /d.,
May 15, 1980, at 6, col. I.
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precluding hostile tender offers. Each of the measures, whether taken
prior to or concurrent with pending hostile offers, is couched in terms
of safeguarding corporate and shareholder interests. Management's role
in the initiation and pursuance of defensive measures is defined at times
by fiduciary concepts, 62 at other times by reference to the statutory
management powers of directors, 63 and on occasion by resort to
economic theory. 64 These diverse standards reflect not a harmony of
goals, hut a confusing panoply of inherently ambiguous, selfcontradictory perspectives. Each of the standards is sufficiently broad to
generate and embrace arguments by both advocates and adversaries of
defensive maneuverings. Fiduciary concepts, for example, both fuel the
ardor of shareholder complaints and offer refuge to beleaguered
management. Similarly, statutory and economic arguments are raised
with equal vigor by both sides on the issue of validity of defensive
measures. What is surprising is not the phenomenon of contrasting use,
wh!ch is predictable whenever broad principles are sought to be applied
to xssues of substantial complexity and competing claims, but rather the
tenacity of such perspectives in light of their inability to provide meaningful guidance. Examination of each ofthe three perspectives may place
their limitations in sharper relief.

B.

Current Perspec#ves for Evaluation of Target
Management Response
1.

Fidudary Concepts

The most alluring theoretical underpinning for examining management's defensive techniques is the "fiduciary" concept. As if the statement
has inherent and authoritative meaning, we are told that directors of
ta.rget companies "have a high fiduciary duty of honesty and fair dealing
wxth shareholders . . . and their dealings with the corporation and its
shareholders are rigorously scrutinized. " 65 This standard creates the
appearance of an acceptable evaluative norm for management actions,
hut upon application it fades into illusion. Justice Frankfurter's oftquoted statement in SEC v. Chenery Corp. testifies to the inherent lack
of substance in the fiduciary concept. 66 In the tender offer context, the
lack of substance becomes glaring. To whom, for example, do the
62. See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
6!1. See notes 11!1-14 infra and accompanying text.
64. See text accompanying notes 148-60 infra.
65. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1!110, 1!119 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
66. Justice Frankfurter stated:
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?
318 u.s. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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so-called fiduciaries owe primary allegiance when corporate and
shareholder interests diverge? Some courts and commentators have stressed
the target corporation.67 Others have pointed to shareholder interests, 68
although noting the inevitable lack of uniformity among shareholders
with respect to investment goals, loyalty to management, and other
influencing factors. 69
The issue of allegiance may be further complicated by variables
within a specific tender offer and by ultimate intentions of the acquiring
company. Where a cash tender offer is the first step in an eventual elimination of all target shareholders through a cash-for-stock merger, does the
fiduciary requirement of "utmost good faith and fair dealing" 70 demand
that management's efforts be limited exclusively to obtaining the highest
price per share possible? Such an argument is plausible since any adverse
effects of the acquisition upon the target corporation will be borne solely
by the acquiring company and its shareholders. Or may shareholder
desires be weighed by target management against the concerns of
employees, customers, and creditors of the target corporation, and if so
what are the priorities of these competing concerns? 71 The complexities of

1
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67. Examples of the belief that fiduciary duty is owed primarily to the target corporation include the following: "[M]anagement has not only the right but the duty to resist by
all lawful means persons whose attempt to win control of the corporation, if successful,
would harm the corporate enterprise." Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977).
"Management should be recognized as possessing the responsibility and power to shape
the corporation's business, its development, its return to investors, and its satisfaction of
social requirements." Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882, 884 (1978).
68. Weiss, Tender Offers and Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv.
445, 446-47 (1978). Weiss stated:
[I]t must be questioned whether ... a request [to enjoin a tender offer] is consistent with management's fiduciary obligation owed to all of the corporation's
stockholders. In seeking to enjoin an offeror from commencing or continuing
with the tender, management may be giving insufficient consideration to the
adverse impact an injunction will have on the rights of those stockholders to
tender.
ld. See also Note, Corporate Directors' Liability for Resisting a Tender Offer: Proposed
Substantive and Procedural Modifications of Existing State Fiduciary Standards, 32
VAND. L. REV. 575, 598 (1979).
69. In Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis,
21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 613 (1970), the author noted that there is no ready answer to
the question whether equal standards are to apply to the interests of both long-term and
short-term holders of target company securities. I d. at 624. See also Weiss, Tender Offers
and Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 445,452 (1978).
70. Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975).
71. See, e.g., Herald v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (lOth Cir. 1972). The Seawell court
noted that the economic interests of the shareholders of the Denver Post were not the sole
concerns of management, citing such noninvestor interests as the preservation of the high
quality of accurate news coverage and the maintenance of favorable employee working
conditions. Id. at 1095. The court was undoubtedly influenced by the particular enterprise involved, noting at one point that "a corporation publishing a great newspaper such
as the Denver Post is, in effect, a quasi-public institution." Id. See generally Note, Herald
Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Social Responsibility?. 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1973).
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tender offer battles give rise to a plethora of similar questions, none of
which is readily answered by reference to a fiduciary concept whose
breadth makes it inherently incapable of creating priorities among the
recipients of its beneficent standards.
Yet the concept survives, even flourishes. Reference to the "fiduciary
duties" of management is prominent in recent tender offer litigation. 72 Its
~opularity is the direct outgrowth of its inherent ambiguity, serving as the
simultaneous rallying cry of both plaintiff shareholders and defendant
management. 73 Frequency of recitation creates an illusion of substance.
The utility of a legal standard must be seriously questioned when the standard is avidly and equally embraced by adversaries. Examination of recent'
cases illustrates the inadequacy of the fiduciary standard.
Fiduciary arguments are raised under state law, although frequently
joined with federal causes of action based on alleged Williams Act violations. 74 In both Berman v. Gerber Products Co. 75 and Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 76 the most direct cases to date involving shareholder
challenges under state law to the validity of management's defensive
measures taken against hostile tender offers, plaintiff shareholders'
allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duties focused upon litigation
undertaken against the acquiring companies. The Berman plaintiffs, for
example, alleged that such litigation "was not motivated by legitimate
business interests but rather by the self-serving interests of the individual
board members. " 77
See also Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 882, 909 (1978).
72. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. III. 1980);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., [Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,188, at
96,529 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, FED. SEC. L. REP. , 97,603 (2d Cir. 1980); Berman v.
Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
73. In Panter, defendant management countered the plaintiff shareholders' claim of
breach of fiduciary obligation by arguing that their actions were required by their
fiduciary obligation to the corporation to avoid an antitrust violation. 486 F. Supp. at
1193-94.
74. Although it has been argued that the Williams Act incorporates a fiduciary concept, see Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REv. 901, 913 (1979), the argument does not appear consistent with current
judicial perceptions. The reference in the Williams Act forbidding "fraudulent" acts or
practices in relation to tender offers, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(e) (1976), has been limited in recent decisions to the context of disclosure violations
rather than "fair dealing" concepts, analogizing to the Sante Fe limitation on 10b-5. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Altman v.
Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
75. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
76. 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
77. 454 F. Supp. at 1317. See also Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F.
Supp. 713, 714-15 (E.D. Va. 1980), in which a shareholder of Universal Leaf brought a
deriv~tive actio~ alleging that directors of Universal breached their fiduciary duties by
opposmg a hostile takeover attempt by Congoleum. The derivative action was upheld
against the claim that disinterested directors could void the suit, but no decision has as yet
been reached on the merits. I d. at 717.
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Both the Berman and Panter courts began their analysis with
reference to fiduciary duty. Lofty statements of fair dealing and rigorous
scrutiny, 78 however, soon gave way in each case to the statutory model of
business judgment, an independent standard carrying a presumption in
favor of management action. Neither court addressed any of the underlying questions that are raised by reference to the fiduciary standard,
including such questions as to whom the fiduciary obligation is owed, the
parameters of fair dealing when shareholder and corporate interests
diverge, and whether the consequences of management's actions inappropriately favor one interest over another. 79 Instead, the Berman court
narrowed its discussion to the legitimacy of Gerber's allegations of disclosure deficiencies. 80 Inasmuch as Anderson Clayton was offering cash for
any and all Gerber shares tendered, it would have been appropriate to
consider who the intended beneficiaries of target management's defensive
litigation were. They were certainly not the shareholders, presumably
well in excess of a majority, who would have tendered. Arguably, the
litigation protected the interests of the nontendering shareholders, on the
assumption that the integrity of Anderson Clayton's management was a
material fact to the remaining Gerber shareholders. Yet the integrity of
the acquiror's management was substantially known-Anderson Clayton
had stated in the tender offer materials that some of its directors and officers were aware of illegal foreign payments. 81 The issue, therefore, was
whether the speculative value of additional information to nontendering
shareholders outweighed the interests of shareholders desiring to tender.
Target management chose the interests of the nontendering shareholders
in initiating litigation. Was management's choice consistent with
fiduciary standards? The Berman court failed to address the questions of
fairness and conflicting interests, avoiding such questions entirely by turning to "[t ]he so-called 'business judgment rule' [that] leaves relatively wide
discretion in management to act in what it considers to be the best interests
of the corporation. " 82 Only lip service was paid to the court's opening
reference to "high fiduciary duty. "83
The Panter court followed a similar pattern, citing first the fiduciary
duties of "honesty, loyalty, good faith, diligence and fairness, " 84 then
shifting to the presumption favoring management's actions "in the
absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion. " 85
78. 454 F. Supp. at 1319; 486 F. Supp. at 1192.
79. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
80. The Berman court stated that "[t]he factual history of this case ... indicates that
the principal dispute between Gerber and Anderson-Clayton centered around the extent
of the disclosure required in connection with Anderson-Clayton's foreign payments
operation." 454 F. Supp. at 1319.
81. Id. at 1315.
82. /d. at 1319 ..
83. See id.
84. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. at 1192.
85. /d. at 1194.
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As in Berman, there was a complete lack of perception of the differing
and competing shareholder and corporate interests, or of the fact that
management unilaterally made choices among such interests. Instead,
the Panter court looked at the narrow question of the antitrust fears of
Marshall Field management, an examination that was inadequate even
on its own terms. 86 One may wonder what reflex reaction caused the Berman and Panter courts to assert fiduciary standards. One would also find
it difficult to give a meaningful content to the fiduciary concept from
these or other court opinions. 87
Even in cases where target management's action has been successfully
challenged, the fiduciary concept has served as no more than a gloss on the
court's reasoning. In Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 88 target
management sought to dilute the effect of a tender offer by issuance of
75,000 share~ to a proposed merger partner. 89 The court premised its
. conclusion against the target board upon a fiduciary standard, citing a
"breach of this [fiduciary] duty ... for directors to make use of issuance
of shares to accomplish an improper purpose. " 90 The reference to "improper purpose" concerned an issuance of shares in circumstances suggesting a
motive of self-perpetuation rather than a valid business objective. 91 In
these circumstances, reference by the court to the fiduciary standard was
unnecessary because the directors failed to adhere to elementary statutory
obligations of management, the issuance of shares having been made
"with precipitous haste with insufficient consideration or opportunity for
consideration of the interest of the corporation or its stockholders. "9%
Reference to fiduciary duty in Condec was not only superfluous but
created unnecessary ambiguity. It has been argued by one commentator,
for example, that even a precipitous sale of shares to thwart an impending
takeover, as was done in Condec, is in the best interests of the corporation,
and thus consistent with a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation. 93 This
86. See note 124 infra.
87. An example of the confusion generated by the use of uncertain terminology is
Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The
court combined references to "that strict impartiality which is required by their
[director's] fiduciary duties," id. at 712-13, with business judgment concepts upholding
management's defensive issuance of shares because "plaintiff has not shown any
likelihood that it can prove that the transaction amounts to fraud." /d. Whatever the con·
tent of the fiduciary model, it scarcely could be regarded as resting narrowly upon the
absence of fraud.
88. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
89. /d. at 358, 230 A.2d at 772-73.
90. Id. at 363, 230 A.2d at 775, citing Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17
A.2d 309, 313 (1941).
91. Id. at 363, 230 A.2d at 776.
92. /d. at 359, 230 A.2d at 773.
93. Lipton states: "Once the directors have properly determined that a takeover
should be rejected they may take any reasonable action to accomplish this purpose,
including ... the issuance of shares to a big brother .... " Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 123-24 (1979).
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management-oriented argument asserts its own answer to the original
enigma-to whom is the fiduciary duty, however defined, owed?
Perhaps the most frequent attempt to give content to the fiduciary
concept is the "primary purpose" test- were the defensive measures
taken primarily for a legitimate corporate purpose or for the improper,
narrow purpose of perpetuation of management control?94 It takes little
imagination, however, for target management oflarge, multidimensional
corporations to elevate arguably plausible corporate concerns as the
"primary" motivation for opposing an unsolicited tender offer. Egregious
circumstances may offer relatively easy cases. 95 But what was the primary
purpose of Marshall Field management in pursuing defensive litigation
based principally on an antitrust opinion from their own counsel? 96 Or
what was the purpose of McGraw-Hill management who professed
substantial concern over the editorial independence of their publications?97 Even if perpetuation of control is found to be one purpose of
management, defensive measures may be justified, we are told, if other
corporate purposes are also served. 98 When does a purpose become
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94. See Note, Herald Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (1973). Thus, courts seek to determine true purpose, and, on
occasion, have enjoined defensive measures "whose sole, primary, compelling and
controlling purpose was to thwart the ... tender offer." Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram
Indus., Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 95,863, at 91,136
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
95. See note 57 supra; text accompanying note 77 supra. See also Petty v. Penntech
Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (redemption of shares in sufficient
percentage to remove an existing threat to management's control).
96. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1181 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
97. McGraw-Hill management strenuously argued that its publication, Business
Week, would suffer a loss of editorial objectivity in the event of an American Express
takeover. Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1979, at 5, col. 1. In this context, to whom is the
"fiduciary" duty owed, and with what consequences? Management clearly sensed a
primary duty to the integrity of one of its principal corporate divisions. Shareholders who
would be cashed out by acceptance of the offer, and therefore would have no continuing
interest in the editorial objectivity of Business Week, regarded their interests as the
appropriate focus. See id., Feb. 20, 1979, at 14, col. 2, describing an eleventh hour effort
by certain McGraw-Hill shareholders to seek shareholder input, led principally by arbitrageurs who had acquired substantial blocks after American Express' initial announcement. The efforts did not reach fruition, although at least five shareholder class action
suits were eventually filed against McGraw-Hill based on management's impeding the
American Express offer. Id. Mar. 2, 1979, at 4, col. 3. Yet even within the shareholder
group there may have existed a sizeable block that agreed with management, as well as
those still undecided. How is the fiduciary concept to be applied to these widely varying
interests? With regard to the Business Week question, does the fiduciary concern of
management include reasonable efforts to overcome the problem so that the offer to
shareholders may go forward? These and numerous other issues surfaced from this struggle, and it is readily apparent that notions of primary motivation, fidelity, fair dealing,
and equally amorphous concepts are totally inadequate as dispositive bases for sifting
through competing interests.
98. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
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primary? In this metaphysical realm, concepts are not easily defined.
Thus one commentator has suggested that "the primary purpose test is
perhaps somewhere between the 'business judgment' and 'fairness' tests
of state law, " 99 hardly a clarifying delineation. 100
An alternative standard for giving content to the fiduciary concept
is reflected in Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 101 the court requiring a "compelling business purpose" to justify the issuance of shares- in Klaus, the
establishment of an ESOT- as a defense measure during a control battle.102 Even the "compelling business purpose" standard, while perhaps
appearing more definitive than other tests, 105 creates broad areas of subjectivity and lack of guidance. As described by the Klaus court, the test
"suggests a balancing of the good to the corporation against the disproportionate advantage to the majority shareholders and incumbent
management." 104 Notions of "balancing," "good to the corporation,"
and "advantage ... to incumbent management" offer scant evidence of
clarity.
The lack of substance in the fiduciary perspective is further illustrated by the efforts of both the Berman and Panter courts to infuse the
concept with content through the so-called "business judgment rule." 105
The fiduciary ideology is grounded on notions of loyalty, fair dealing,
and avoidance of conflict. This is far removed from the judicially-created
99. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 86-87.
100. The "primary purpose" test has been further criticized with regard to the ambiguity of the term "primary" (is the primary motive that which is stronger than all other
motives combined, or simply the strongest of any individual motive?) and the uncertainty
of determining motives when board members act collectively, each member perhaps
responding to a different influencing factor. See Gelfond & Sebastion, Reevaluating the
Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U. L. REV. 403, 437-43
(1980).
101. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 233-34. It is not coincidental that Klaus is a Ninth Circuit decision, for the
court's standard was taken from the language of the California Supreme Court in Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599
(1969), dealing with the obligations of controlling shareholders.
103. In Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1978), the author argued
for universal adoption of the "compelling business purpose" test as "more consistent with
the inevitable conflict of interest faced by management in a contested control situation.
Adoption of this test would subject many defensive tactics to claims of breach of fiduciary
duty, a radical departure from much of existing law." Id. at 44. It is difficult to accept
the author's implication that clarity is obtained by the confluence of "compelling business
purpose," burden of proof, and the fiduciary duty context, for defensive measures are frequently defended on plausible business and fiduciary grounds. The content of these
ambiguous standards is what creates the problems of application, and perceptions may
vary among courts just as they vary among management and shareholders. It would
therefore be preferable to consider standards that _avoid such inherently ambiguous terminology.
104. 528 F.2d at 234.
105. See text accompanying notes 78-87 supra.
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presumption favoring the business decisions of management so long as
such decisions are made "in the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion." 106 The distinctions between the two
create differing burdens of proof and, depending upon which standard is
selected, the burden created may be dispositive of particular actions. 107
Yet, precisely because the fiduciary concept lacks inherent guidelines,
courts are prone to a confusion of terms and an implicit, perhaps even
unknowing, rejection of fiduciary ideology. 108
Definitional content to fiduciary concepts is impeded in part because
a tender offer is directed to target shareholders in their individual
capacities. There is no clearly defined role for target management
analogous to merger or sale of asset transactions. 109 Thus courts and
commentators are left groping for substance. Notions of good faith,
honesty, loyalty, and other virtues inherent in the fiduciary model are
not readily translatable into decisional standards in the complexities of
hostile tender offer struggles. The result predictably has been polarization of opinion, ranging from the argument that directors breach their
fiduciary duty whenever they aggressively impede an offer from reaching
shareholdersno to the position that "the ever-present fiduciary obligation
of management ... [justifies] taking such reasonable action as they deem
appropriate to frustrate or delay an unsolicited takeover attempt. "m
106. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. at 1194.
107. The distinction and effect upon results are illustrated by the recent Second Circuit decision in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 97,603 (2d
Cir. 1980), reversing the district court's injunction against the voting of shares issued by
Treadway during the midst of a control battle with Care. /d. at 98,213. The district court
focused upon Treadway management's fiduciary duty to shareholders and enjoined the
issued shares from voting in light of its conclusion that "Treadway's incumbent management was primarily motivated by its desire to stave off a Care takeover bid." 490 F. Supp.
668, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Second Circuit found that the lower court "did not apply
the standard business judgment analysis" and reversed, based upon a failure of plaintiff
to overcome the presumption that directors "have acted properly and in good faith." FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,603, at 98,210-11; see note 112 infra. Similarly, in Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. Internorth, Inc., No. 80-7865 (2d Cir. 1980), an injunction against certain defensive measures was reversed based upon the appellate court's reallocation of the burden of
proof to plaintiffs rather than target company directors.
108. In Brundney, Fiduciary Ideology i'n Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65
MICH. L. REv. 259 (1966), the author points out that Delaware courts, in considering the
repurchase of shares by corporations during control fights have, in the author's opinion,
erroneously slipped into business judgment standards rather than viewing the issues
within the fiduciary context of a duty of loyalty. /d. at 273-77.
109. The Williams Act permits but does not require target management to issue a
statement recommending or opposing the tender offer. § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)
(1976). Limited authority is given to target management by some state antitakeover
statutes permitting management to invoke state administrative review. See, e.g., OHIO
REv. CODE ANN.§ 1707.041(B)(1)(b) (1979).
110. A Bn"ef Against Managements that Fight Off Tender Offers, FORTUNE, Mar. 12,
1979, at 159.
111. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 882, 894 (1978).
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Competing arguments often are based on wholly discrete perceptions of
the proper object of management's "fiduciary" concerns. Perceptions
vary as well among courts, resulting in decisions that lend neither
guidance nor substance to already ambiguous standards. 112

2.

II

IIi

I

It'

r
I

Statutory Provisions

A distinct perspective for evaluation of defensive measures centers
upon statutory provisions that hopefully avoid the ambiguities of
common-law and equity doctrines by defining the specific roles of management and shareholders. This perspective, however, embraces several
independent statutory bases. Thus, in common with the problems raised
by fiduciary concepts, varying statutory provisions support arguments of
both challengers and defenders of defensive measures. Moreover, resort
to a statutory perspective is futher clouded by the imprecision of broad
statutory language, as well as by a lack of clear delineation to determine
which of several potentially conflicting statutory provisions have priority
in application.
A starting point for some courts and commentators is the provision
found universally in statutory codes granting to directors broad discretionary authority to manage the conduct and affairs of the corporation. m
112. The problems in application of ambiguous standards are reflected in Treadway
Cos. v. Care Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 97,603 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the
perceptions of management motivation differed sharply between the district court and
court of appeals. The district court, noting the haste bY'which a substantial block of
shares was issued to a third party, the unusual terms of the transaction mandating the
eventual redemption of such shares, and management's obvious efforts to avoid a
shareholder vote on the issuance, concluded that "Treadway's incumbent management
was primarily motivated by its desire to stave off a Care takeover bid." 490 F. Supp. at
687. The Second Circuit, however, reversing the lower court's issuance of an injunction,
found "the critical fact, in our view, is that the Treadway board ... in approving the
stock sale ... were moving Treadway toward a business combination with Fair Lanes."
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 97,603, at 98,212. The Second Circuit's opinion suffers from
several weaknesses compared to the extensive discussion of issues in the lower court. The
appellate court failed to address the unusual terms of the issuance, such as mandatory
redemption, and dismissed in a cursory and inadequate footnote the problem of dilution
of minority shares that abrogated a statutorily created veto right. /d. at 98,211-12 n.48.
Moreover, if the court of appeals was prepared to accept the issuance as a first step
toward a business combination, a matter of substantial shareholder concern and statutory
rights, the court was unaccountably silent regarding the district court's finding that
"Treadway has consistently structured its proposed transactions so as to avoid shareholder
scrutiny." 490 F. Supp. at 686. If business combination was a major purpose, then why is
not shareholder scrutiny appropriate? The court would have been better served had it
kept in mind its earlier admonishment in Butler Aviation lnt'l v. Comprehensive
Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970), that "[w]hile courts should rigorously
enforce the policy of honesty and fair dealing prescribed by federal securities legislation,
they must guard against the risk that, at the instance of incumbent management, they
may be frustrating informed shareholders from doing what the latter want." /d. at 845.
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1978); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT§ 35
(1975). In Treadway, challenging Treadway's defensive issuance of shares in an effort to
dilute Care's holdings and prevent an eventual Care takeover, the court noted that "the
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Within that grant of authority, it is argued, there can be no more important judgment for directors than to consider the future viability and longterm interests of the corporation. Thus, it is argued, it makes little sense to
permit directors to make decisions regarding day-to-day business operations but preclude them from taking appropriate action in instances where
they perceive that corporate welfare is threatened by a potential
takeover .u• The natural extension of such reasoning is to apply the
"business judgment rule" to takeover defenses in the same manner the
rule applies to other operational decisions of management. As noted
earlier, 115 the result of applying the rule may be a substantial deference
to the presumed business expertise of management, a deference overcome only by gross overreaching or fraud. In Northwest Industries, Inc.
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 116 a derivative action based upon target management's hastily arranged issuance of shares to a friendly third party was
dismissed because "management has the responsibility to oppose offers
which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to the company or its
stockholders. " 117 Similarly the directed verdict in Panter was based on "a
presumption of sound business judgment . . . , which courts will not
disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their [directors'] decisions. " 118
The business judgment rule may offer greater certainty than the
fiduciary model, but it suffers from equally severe limitations for evaluative
purposes. Rarely will a target corporation, particularly one advised by
knowledgeable counsel, 119 be unable to devise a plausible business purstarting point in our analysis is the business judgment rule," citing New Jersey's statutory
delegation of managerial authority to the board of directors. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH),
97,603, at 98,210.
114. Lipton comments:
A takeover bid is no different than any other fundamental business decision ....
As long as matters such as capital expenditures, discontinuances of businesses
and bankruptcy are for the reasonable business judgment of the directors, there
is no reason to put acceptance or rejection of a takeover bid on any different
basis.
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 120 (1979).
115. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
116. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
117. /d. at 712. Cary, commenting upon the court's attitude in Northwest Industries,
concluded that "if that philosophy prevails on the part of a court, it is very much an open
field for an incumbent management." Cary, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management from Attack, 25 Bus. LAW. 839, 841 (1970).
118. 486 F. Supp. at 1194.
119. The role of corporate counsel in advising and assisting target management raises
questions of potential conflict that are not readily resolvable. Both the ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5·18 (1978) and the proposed MODEL RULES OF PROFES·
SIONAL CONDUCT § 1.13 stress that a lawyer represents the corporate entity distinct from
its directors, officers, and shareholders. When counsel perceives or reasonably suspects
that target management is motivated principally by personal rather than corporate con·
cerns, to what extent may counsel actively advise and coordinate efforts as to defensive
measures? The Code and Model Rules imply that counsel should not act in such cir·
cumstances .. But there may be a marked gap between standards and practice, for it would
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pose for its conduct. 1Z° For example, the Panter court accepted the
legitimacy of defensive acquisitions even though none of the acquisitions
was pursued prior to the initiation of takeover efforts. m The court also
readily accepted management's decision to undertake defensive
litigation. m Judicial deference to a presumed business judgment is starkly
exhibited by the court's acceptance of the argument that a "business judgment'' was made by Marshall Field directors when they concluded that the
proposed Carter Hawley Hale offer justified antitrust litigation.m The
directors' conduct in this regard exhibited a determined unwillingness to
consider financial and other corporate benefits of the proposed merger
and a marked eagerness to embrace antitrust concerns to support their
opposition.l%4 If the facts in Panter support a "business judgment" as to
be unreasonable to expect counsel to undertake an independent investigation of management motivations. Nor would it be reasonable to demand that counsel independently
evaluate whether the tender offer is advantageous for its corporate client. Reliance will
necessarily bt: placed upon management expertise. Is reliance reasonable in a hostile
tender offer context? The issue is deserving of careful study and evaluation. See Cary,
Professional Responsibility in the Practice of Corporation Law: The Murky Divide
Between Right and Wrong, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 27, 29-30 (N.
Galston ed. 1977). It is appropriate to note that adoption of standards proposed by the
sale of control analogue would ameliorate a substantial aspect of the problem by reducing
the area of unilateral management activity.
120. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 74, at 926 ("Besieged with business reasons
justifying the use of a maneuver, a court applying the business purpose test frequently
finds itself compelled to legitimize the corporate conduct."). See also U.S. Smelting v.
Clevite Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968), in which the court
noted the serious time pressures on target management and approved the hasty decision
as consistent with valid business judgment in light of the "exigencies of the situation." /d.
at 99,047.
121. 486 F. Supp. at 1194; see note 230 infra.
122. 486 F. Supp. at 1194.
123. /d.
124. Although both Carter Hawley and Marshall Field operated stores throughout the
country, antitrust concerns involved only the Chicago area, focusing upon one store
operated by Caner Hawley in Northbrook Court, potential competition with regard to
two future sites, and existing competition in the retail sales of books. /d. at 1180.
Management's judgment was based upon an opinion of counsel from the company's law
firm in response to a request from Angelo Arena, Marshall Field's president. Id.
Although over three months passed between the date of the opinion and Carter Hawley's
eventual withdrawal, no further consideration was made of the antitrust issues despite the
facts that: (a) the issues were fairly narrow in scope and therefore potentially resolvable;
(b) Carter Hawley advised Marshall Field of its willingness to sell the Northbrook store,
the primary source of concern, id. at 1180; (c) Marshall Field management should haVe
been aware, and at least one director was so advised by Carter Hawley, that the FTC had
approved prior department store mergers, including one involving the leading company
in the industry, Deposition of Edward McCormick Blair, Sept. 29, 1978; and (d) Marshall
Field management was aware that Caner Hawley's attorneys had opined "that there is no
antitrust deterrent" to the potential merger. 486 F. Supp. at 1188. The potential merger,
apart from antitrust concerns, held substantial promise for Marshall Field and its
shareholders. It appears that at least Arena believed that advantages were present.
Deposition of Angelo Arena, Oct. 2, 1978 ("There is some benefit to be accrued by pooling
of managements and pooling of special professional people in a bigger organization . . ..
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the antitrust concerns, it is difficult to imagine what minimum attention
by directors to any problem will not constitute a judicially protected
"business judgment." The deference accorded management by the
Panter court creates for defensive litigation an aura of legitimacy that
the much-criticized Cheffs v. Mathes 125 decision creates for the defensive
repurchase of shares.
Apart from validating unwarranted judicial deference, the "business
judgment rule" creates a presumption for management action in corporate governance situations traditionally and statutorily entrusted to
shareholder control. Thus, it has been argued that defensive measures
impede, and are therefore contrary to, the shareholders' fundamental
right to determine the management structure of their corporation. 126
The division of ownership and management in modern corporations has
constricted the sphere of shareholder action, with the rights to elect 1Z7
and alter managementl%8 being perhaps the last and most fundamental
vestiges of shareholder authority. These rights, coupled with the
statutory authority in many states to call special shareholder meetings, 1z9
create an ongoing authority in shareholders to determine corporate
management. A tender offer represents an opportunity for a single
shareholder to acquire sufficient shares to invoke the statutory provisions
available for a midstream change in management. Viewed in this
perspective, constraints upon shareholder action must be seriously questioned, for there is no compelling basis for preferring a grant of statutory
authority to directors over a distinct grant of statutory authority to
shareholders. 150
And I don't doubt that those points were valid, so I accepted the bulk of what Phil Hawley
said as being reasonable .... "). In such circumstances it would be reasonable to expect
additional efforts to determine the depth and scope of antitrust concerns and whether
existing problems could be readily resolved through divestiture or other means. No effort
in any direction was made. Deposition of Edward McCormick Blair, Sept. 28, 1978 (stating
that he gave no consideration to Carter Hawley's suggestion that its Northbrook store could
be sold, being satisfied to rest totally on counsel's original opinion). In these circumstances
it is difficult to perceive or accept as valid the "business judgment" that was made. The
lack of any effort to apply business consideration is understandable in light of, but not
justified by, the long·standing commitment of management to remain independent, a
commitment "expressed so many times that at least two directors ... recall it being stated
as policy." 486 F. Supp. at 11 77.
125. 41 Del. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); see Israels, Corporate Purchase of its Own
Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620, 624 (1965).
126. Yoran, Advance Defensive Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 AM.]. COMP. L.
531, 532 (1973).
127. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1974).
128. See id. § 141(k) (Supp. 1978).
129. See FLA. STAT. § 607 .084(3) (1977); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 28
(1975). Limiting or denying the ability of shareholders to call special meetings is an additional defensive measure that may be taken by target management. By-law amendments
were recently adopted by the American Investment Company eliminating such right of
shareholders. Wall St.]., July 28, 1980, at 4, col. 4.
130. In Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), the court denied the
applicability of the business judgment rule as a basis for directors compelling the dismissal
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The foregoing conflict of statutory authority is clouded by yet another
statutory provision cited for target management intervention, namely
those provisions requiring director consent to statutory merger. 131 Application of the provision is premised on the fact that a successful tender offer for
a controlling interest is essentially equivalent to a merger, particularly
when the offer is the first step in an eventual two-step merger process. 132
The merger analogy is not for the purpose of requiring a formal director
vote, but rather to justify director consideration of the merits of the proposed tender offer and to thereafter take actions consistent with their
conclusions. This argument has shades of the de facto merger concept, 155
seeking application of statutory provisions when the effect, but not the procedure, of the transaction is arguably governed by statutory policy. The
merger analogy for tender offers seeks to justify director response, while the
de facto merger doctrine is designed to permit shareholder involvement.
of a derivative action. The business judgment rule was regarded as a "limitation of
liability" and "not an independent grant of authority to the directors to dismiss derivative
suits." /d. at 1262. Accord, Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 351-54 (S.D. Tex.
1980); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Va. 1980).
Contra, Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1980). The
Maldonado court was influenced by the ability of "an impartial tribunal, and not a committee appointed by the alleged wrongdoers," to decide the merits of the particular claims.
413 A.2d at 1263. Relevance of these decisions to the tender offer context is not immediately apparent, but the opinions represent a possible crack in the business judgment rule in
instances where conflicting claims of shareholders and management may be readily resolved
through the judicial process. Unilateral defensive measures by target management may
thwart a tender offer without shareholder input, despite the fact that a tender offer, like a
derivative action, is a matter directed to the decisionmaking by individual shareholders.
Regarding the tender offer as analogous to a collective sale of control, the judgment of
tendering shareholders should not be subordinated to a presumption that management's
"business judgment" should prevail. To do so without the leavening process of adjudication would create a burdensome restraint on the alienability of minority shares not present in transfers by dominant shareholders. It will be interesting to observe whether the
reasoning in the Maldonado and Maher opinions is expanded to contexts other than
derivative actions.
131. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974).
132. Frequently the tender offer seeks only to acquire working control to achieve an
eventual merger between the acquiring company and target. Thus, it is argued that
tender offers should not subvert a major role of management in merger transactions, i.e.,
bargaining for consideration, a role that results in a more favorable retum to shareholders
than would ensue if acquirors were able to deal with the shareholders on an individual
basis. See Harzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist
Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REC. 152, 153 (1979). This argument gives economic justifica·
tion to the involvement of directors under a merger equivalency theory. Lipton, supra
note 93, at 116.
133. Transactions not formulated pursuant to statutory merger provisions, yet creating
substantially or identically equivalent results as such mergers, have in some instances been
treated by courts as "de facto mergers" in order to apply statutory merger provisions as to
shareholder votes and appraisal procedures. Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277,
1285-86, 136 N.W.2d 410, 415 (1965); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 433-35,
143 A.2d 25, 29-30 (1958). Contra, Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326,
330-32, 182 A.2d 22, 25-26 (1963), affd, 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963).
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Yet each of the arguments is derived from functional equivalence and from
analogy to explicit statutory provisions.
The merger analogy has superficial appeal, but flounders as a standard by which to evaluate defensive measures. The analogy offers no
guides or criteria to determine what defensive tactics might be appropriate. A board dissatisfied with the proposed terms of a statutory merger
has absolute veto power over that transaction. 1u Even under a merger
analogy, however, there would be no role for a formal board veto of the
tender offer, a transaction not requiring corporate action for its consummation. Short of a veto power, therefore, what defensive measures would
be appropriate under a merger analogy? Since mergers are effected
through shareholder action following proxy solicitation, is management's
role limited to a proxy-type disclosure? The latter role would be consistent with the Williams Act, and indeed it has been argued that the Act
has limited management to communications alone. 135 Thus, again there
are competing, independent statutory arguments raised in support of, or in
opposition to, management involvement. Moreover, the merger analogy
offers little guidance where the tender offer is for less than a majority of the
shares, or when the acquiring company has no announced intention of
ultimate merger.
Business judgment, corporate governance, and merger analogies are
arguments based upon state corporate codes. At the federal level, and
, rounding out the diverse statutory elements, is the Williams Act. 156 The
lack of reference in the Williams Act to specific defensive measures has
fueled arguments on both sides of tender offer struggles regarding the
effect of the Act upon evaluation of such measures. For example, it is
argued that the principal purpose of the Act, citing legislative history, 157 is
to create a balancing between the target company and the acquiror so that
shareholders of the target company are not met with the pre-Williams Act
situation of having to make immediate decisions based upon relatively
134. A board veto may not be overridden by shareholder vote. The remote possibility
exists, of course, that a shareholder revolt will remove and replace the board.
135. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 74, at 933·38; see text accompanying note 139

See notes 1, 8 supra.
Support for the argument that the Williams Act limits target management discre·
tion is drawn from the remarks of Senator Harrison Williams, sponsor of the legislation:
This measure is not aimed at obstructing legitimate takeover bids. In some
instances, a change in management will prove a welcome boon for share·
holder[s] ... and ... it may be necessary ifthe company is to survive.
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to
protect ... corporation, management, and shareholders .... Every effort has
been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of
management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of this bill is to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time pro·
viding the offeror, and mangement equal opportunity to fairly present their
case.
113 CONG, REC, 854·55 (1967).
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little information. 138 The balancing is achieved through disclosure
mechanisms and minimum time frames, one purpose of the minimum
time frames being to permit target management, should they so desire,
to provide shareholders with additional information, recoi?mendati~ns,
and arguments respecting the merits of the offer. From this perspective,
the permissible activity of target management is fairly limited, and is
designed primarily to provide information to shareholders so that they
may make an intelligent decision about whether to tender their shares.
Any other management action that interferes with the shareholder decisionmaking process creates a disturbance in the balance of the Williams
Act and, it is argued, is impermissible conduct under that Act. 139
Equally plausible, however, is the argument that the disclosure
mechanisms and various time frames provided for in the Act are not inconsistent with, but rather support, aggressive defensive measures by target
management designed to impede the takeover effort. From this perspective, the Williams Act provides restraints upon the acquiring company to a
much greater degree than might be imposed upon target management.
Seen primarily as a protective measure against acquiring companies, the
Williams Act is thus viewed as neutral to the taking of defensive
measures. The neutrality of the Act is silent support for defensive tactics,
as Congress arguably chose to regulate only disclosure aspects and not
other defensive activities of target management.
These alternative arguments mask a more serious weakness within the
Williams Act context: the Act's provisions are not triggered unless and until
there is a tender offer or a public announcement of an intended offer. 140
Where scorched earth tactics prevent a proposed offer from reaching fruition- as is generally their intent- there may be substantial doubt whether
the threshold jurisdictional elements of the Williams Act have been
satisfied. Shareholders of McGraw-Hill, Gerber Products, and Marshall
Field were all met with narrow judicial approaches that denied Williams
Act claims. 141
138. Note, Target Management and Tender Offers: Proposals for Structuring the
FiduciaryRelationshzp, 15 HARV.J. LEGIS. 761,768 (1978).
139. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 74, at 973.
140. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. lll4, ll25-26 (D. Mass.
1978).
141. Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3332 (Nov. 3, 1980) (No. 79-2054); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168,
1190 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.O. Mich.
1978). It may be questioned whether these decisions, which effectively deny Williams Act .
application where defensive measures have successfully impeded a tender offer, do not take
too narrow a view of the remedial purposes of the Act. In Panter, for example, where the
court held that the Act did not apply because Carter Hawley's proposed tender offer had
not commenced or been announced in a sufficiently unconditional manner, 485 F. Supp.
at 1190-91, the effect upon the market of Carter Hawley's announced intentions was
substantially similar to what the market reaction would have been if the offer had been ·
unconditionally commenced. A flurry of trading activity increased the price of Marshall
Field stock over 30%, and investor decisions were being made by numerous shareholders·
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The jurisdictional problem, however, pales in comparison to the
possibility that a private cause of action has not been created by the
Williams Act. Shareholders conceivably will be without any Williams Act
basis to challenge defensive measures, either on grounds of disclosure or
on broader aspects of fraud or denial of "fair opportunity." 142 The
Supreme Court in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industn:es 143 carefully limited its
opinion to denying standing to tender offerors suing for damages from
target corporations, 144 but recent denials by the Court of implied private
causes of action in other securities law contexts 145 raise doubt about
whether an implied right for private actions under the Williams Act by
aggrieved shareholders will in fact be upheld. 146
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the statutory perspective contains elements that both justify and challenge unilateral defensive actions
by target management. While not suffering from the inherent ambiguities
of fiduciary concepts, the statutory approach fails because of conflicting
emphases placed upon alternative statutory provisions. w Here too, the

" Offers: Proposals for Structunng the
• 768 (1978).
73.
.- 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1125-26 (D. Mass.

!d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
brshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168,
::0., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.O. Mich.
ions, which effectively deny Williams Act
IISfully impeded a tender offer, do not take
1e Act. In Panter, for example, where the
arter Hawley's proposed tender offer had
ntly unconditional manner, 485 F. Supp.
rtevHawley's announced intentions was
n ~ould have been if the offer had been
~ ac_tivity increased the price of Marshall
re being made by numerous shareholders

505

and arbitrageurs in light of the pending tender offer struggle. Id. at 1182-84. It seems to
strain logic under these circumstances to suggest that the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the Williams Act should not be applicable. The narrow readings of the Williams
Act in this regard are in marked contrast to the more expansive interpretations found in
other cases seeking to define the notion of tender offer. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson,
475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
142. See Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 95,863, at 91,136 (C.D. Cal. 1976), discussed at note 57

supra.

143. 430 u.s. 1 (1977).
144. Id. at47.
145. Transamerica Mort. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979) (no
private right of action for damages under§ 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569-71 (1979) (no private right of action
under§ 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
146. See generally Phillips & Nicholson, Chris-Craft, 10 REv. SEC. REG. 891 (1977). In
Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980), a
private right of action was specifically denied on the basis of Supreme Court precedent in
other securities contexts. Id. at 101. Accord, Sta-Rite, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH), 97,613 (E.D. Wis. 1980). Contra, Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d
1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH), 97,580, at 98,071 (W.O. Mich. 1980).
147. A suggestion that combines statutory and fiduciary perspectives would apply the
business judgment presumption to decisions made by "outside" directors, and a
presumably higher, "fairness" standard to decisions made by an insider-dominated
board. Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management 1n a Hostile
Tender Offer, 60 B.U. L. REv. 403, 447 (1980). The dual approach is based on the
premise that "outside" directors are more likely to reach an objective decision than
insiders, a premise that may well be questionable even in a control context. See Solomon,
Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise.P, 76 MICH.
L. REv. 581, 590 (1978). Moreover, use of the business judgment standard in tender offer
battles is problematic. The authors noted as much when they concluded in an earlier portion of their article that "this standard of culpability [business judgment rule] ignores
both the realities of corporate control contests and the balances adopted in related areas
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difficulty of developing a standard for evaluating defensive measures lies
not in the illegitimacy of any particular argument, but rather in the
diversity that exists within the framework of the evaluative effort.

3.

II

Ill
ill
~ll

:11

Economic Interests

If fiduciary concepts and statutory constructs are unable to provide
firm guidance to evaluate defensive measures, perhaps economic theory
can fill the void. The economic approach views the several actors in a
tender offer battle from the perspective of economic interests that each
of those actors is seeking or is charged with protecting.
Arguments favoring active target management intervention stress that
corporate directors are much more qualified than shareholders to make
judgments affecting the corporation's long-term economic viability. Directors are regarded as possessing greater ability and objectivity to consider
the long-range concerns raised by a tender offer, including the interests of
employees, suppliers, and other groups that may be materially affected.
Shareholders, on the other hand, are seen as having a narrower interest,
namely, their particular investment in the target's stock. This limited
perspective inevitably compels shareholders, it is argued, to favor
immediate, favorable, short-term returns, and to disregard long-term
consequences to the corporation, nontendering shareholders, and other
interests. 148 This argument is buttressed by the frequent presence of arbitrageurs and other speculators, who often compose a significant percent·
age of shareholders during a tender offer fight and whose interests are
undeniably short-term. m Some commentators, so taken by the perceived
dichotomy between management's high road and shareholders' low road,
regard it as a matter of "national policy" that directors be allowed to interof corporate law." Gelfond & Sebastian, supra, at 434. Finally, the suggested approach
assumes ready application to specific defensive measures. Inherent ambiguities within
business judgment and fairness standards, however, provipe little guidance to judge the
validity of actual measures.
148. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. R.Fs.
L. REv. 882, 891 (1978). Regarding the shareholder's interest in a corporation as a
monetary one limited solely to the value of his stock leads to the argument that the social
and broad economic repercussions of a shift in control is too important a decision to leave
to shareholders motivated solely by personal concerns. Lipton, supra note 93, at 113-16.
Although shareholders interested primarily in long-term, low-risk growth may constitute
a block favoring defensive measures, it may reasonably be presumed that in most hostile
tender offer situations the pro-management block represents an insubstantial minority.
Indeed a major factor in considering the prospects of a tender offer is the dispersal of·
shares of the target company and management's lack of control of sizeable blocks. E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 6 (1973).
149. The role of arbitrageurs in tender offers is discussed in O'Boyle, Changing Tactics
in Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAW. 863, 865 (1970), and Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW ..
1315, 1315 (1977). Because arbitrageurs may constitute a pressure group upon manage·
ment to accept or at least not impede the tender offer from going forward, it is important
from a tactical standpoint that target management act with sufficient speed and force to
discourage substantial arbitrage activity.
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vene in the tender offer process. 150 Indeed, it has been suggested that the
social and economic consequences of a relatively unbridled tender offer
movement are matters of such moment that neither shareholders nor
management should be entrusted with major economic decisions, but that
Congress should establish a more pointed public policy limiting tender
offer efforts. 151 Such perspectives are of course completely antithetical to
any notion of a substantial shareholder role in the decisionmaking process.t52
A related economic argument favoring management is that management is most capable of determining whether the acquiring company is
offering sufficient value for the target shares. Although tender offers may
be at substantial premiums over market price, it is argued that the
"inherent values" of the shares- presumably not reflected on the
market- may be higher yet. 153 Defensive measures are thus justified as a
means of improving the offering price, assuming a willingness to
~ompromise on share value by acquiring and target managements. 15 •

defensive measures lies
lar argument, but rather in the
trk of the evaluative effort.
lnt~rests

constructs are unable to provide
asures, perhaps economic theory
lch views the several actors in a
: of economic interests that each
with protecting.
magement intervention stress that ·
lifield than shareholders to make
.g-term economic viability. Direc);»ility and objectivity to consider
~r 6ffer, including the interests of
that may be materially affected.
~ as having a narrower interest,
the target's stock. This limited
&lders, it is argued, to favor
ns, and to disregard long-term
1dering shareholders, and other
~y the frequent presence of arbiD. compose a significant percenter fight. and whose interests are
tators, so taken by the perceived
'Oad and shareholders' low road,
h~ directors be allowed to inter-

1~ 434. Finally, the suggested approach
measures. Inherent ambiguities within
er, provip.e little guidance to judge the

Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs.
tolder's interest in a corporation as a
dt leads to the argument that the social
ttrol is too important a decision to leave
ems. Lipton, supra note 93, at 113-16.
g-term, low-risk growth may constitute
11ably be presumed that in most hostile
(represents an insubstantial minority.
:ts of a tender offer is the dispersal of
lack of control of sizeable blocks. E.
IRPORATE CONTROL 6 (1973).
iliscussed in O'Boyle, Changing Tactics
and Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW.
ltit~e a pressure group upon manage'fet from going forward, it is important
t act with sufficient speed and force to

41

507

150. One commentator stated:
Rather than forcing directors to consider only the short-term interests of certain
shareholders, national policy requires that directors also consider the long-term
interests of the shareholders and the company as a business enterprise with all of
its constituencies in addition to the short-term institutional shareholders.
Lipton, supra note 93, at 115.
151. Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y. L ScH. L REV. 687,
706-07 (1978).
152. A more fundamental position endorsing management priority may be based on
the broad disparity between "ownership" and "control" of a corporation, thoroughly
analyzed as early as 1932 by A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 220-32 (1932). If in fact corporations may be best viewed "as an intricate, centralized, economic-administrative structure run by professional managers who
hire capital from the investor," Manning, Book Review, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER,
67 YALE LJ 1477, 1489 (1958), any shareholder-investor role in control or other longterm economic decisions would be anomalous. The investor role would be no different
than that oflenders or long-term creditors, neither of which groups are regarded as entitled
to cause a change in corporate control. The argument would be stronger, however, had
the disparity of ownership and control resulted during the past 50 years in any statutory
movement to restrict shareholder suffrage or the ability to remove directors. In fact the
recent trend has been opposite, witness the increased SEC emphasis upon notions of "corporate democracy" and ~tate statutory provisions permitting shareholder removal of
directors without cause. The attitude inherent within the continuing role for shareholders
is that shareholder ability to remove management, however limited or infrequently exercised, remains a positive check upon management excesses and abuse of power. Manning,
for example, having recognized the investor role of shareholders, also noted that "powerful arguments can be advanced to justify the corporate 'raid' as a mechanism for
reallocating frozen assets." Id. at 1488-89. No "raid" could be effectively accomplished
without shareholder cooperation.
153. Long, Director Fiducian'es: Protecting Shareholder Interest, 14 MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1980, at 5.
154. Harzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate ·Directors Have a Right to Resist
Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REc. 152, 154 (1979); see text accompanying notes 242-45
infra (regarding defensive measures assertedly undertaken by reason of price
inadequacy).
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Accordingly it has been argued that the proper test for judging defensive
actions is "whether the defensive action is reasonably calculated to benefit
shareholders in a market sense, that is, higher values for their securities." 155
This argument suffers from an inability to distinguish good faith efforts
to determine "inherent value" from the employment of a price inadequacy concern as a smokescreen for management's feared loss of control.
Determining the bona fides of management's position is made considerably more difficult by the subjective nature of "inherent value."
Opinions of investment counsel often vary widely, particularly in the soft
areas of long-term forecasting, effects of synergism, and long-range
economic conditions. 156
A contrasting argument would suggest that it is ironic for management to be posing as the protector of shareholder returns, for the presumably undervalued market price may be a reflection of the market's
collective judgment of the inefficiency of current management. 157
Acquiring companies are prepared to pay substantial premiums for
target shares presumably because they foresee an ability to create a more
productive use of assets than exists under target management. Hostile
tender offers thus serve a useful economic purpose in upgrading, or at
least serving as a prod to improve, management performance. 158 For this
reason it has been suggested that management's veto role-even in
statutory mergers-is inimical to assuring that "corporations are controlled by those who can use that control most productively." 159 Defensive
measures are thus regarded as contrary to economic efficiency because
155. Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 613, 655 (1970). See also Note, Corporate Directors' Liability for
Resisting a Tender Offer: Proposed Substantive and Procedural Modifications of Existing
State Fiduciary Standards, 32 VAND. L. REv. 575, 603 (1979).
156. During the course of the American Express tender offer effort, McGraw·Hiii
chairman Harold McGraw was reported to state: "Who says we have an obligation to sell
this company: I never saw times better for (McGraw-Hill)." Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1979, at
31, col. 3. If such better times were so evident, it may be questioned why the market price
of McGraw-Hill was not higher and why the market price following the withdrawal by
American Express dropped back to close to its preoffer position. Unless we are to give lit·
tie if any credence to the efficient capital market hypothesis, it may be questioned
whether Chairman McGraw was basing his comment on information not adequately
disclosed to the public investors.
157. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 12.5 (1972); Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978).
158. The economic value of the tender offer phenomenon was noted by the court in
Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I, 8 (S.D. Ind. 1978) ("A tender offer plays an
important role in the health of the national economy in that it serves as a device which
helps to maintain accountability of corporate management to its shareholders."). Similarly
the Senate Report on the Williams Act noted that "takeover bids should not be discouraged
because they serve a useful purpose of providing a check on entrenched but inefficient
management." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
159. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAYLSIS OF LAW§ 12.5, at 183 (1972).
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they hinder the ability of shareholders to remove inefficient management
and preclude obtaining the greatest return on shareholder investment.
Although each of the economically oriented arguments contain
elements of legitimacy, there is no apparent basis for embracing one
economic perspective over another for evaluating defensive measures.
Despite the economists' delight in empirical evidence, there is a paucity
of evidence in the tender offer context to support any particular
economic theory. 160 Dispositive data as to the desirability of any one
economic perspective could scarely be expected given the unavoidably
speculative nature of judgments regarding the desirability of a particular
takeover, and the vicissitudes of economic and market conditions following a successful defense to a tender offer .
PART II

A.

Sale of Control Analogue

The inability of courts and commentators to concur on a standard to
evaluate defensive measures is due in part to the inherent ambiguities of
fiduciary concepts, the diversity of statutory provisions arguably applicable, and the conflicting perspectives within economic arguments. It is also
due to the use of defensive measures in an aggressive, explosive environment alien to traditional modes of corporate conduct out of which such
concepts as fiduciary duty and business judgment have evolved. Hostile
tender offers involving multinational corporations, thousands of
disparate shareholders, and scorched earth defensive tactics employing a
costly array of counsel, investment bankers, accountants, and publicists
are a relatively recent phenomenon. The phenomenon has created a
'distinct lexicon, including delightfully descriptive phrases such as "bear
" "sleeping beauties," "Saturday night specials," and "white
auu~m:;," but from an evaluative standpoint the ingenuity, speed, and
iCOmplexity of defensive measures have outrun the slower-paced judicial
than attempt to squeeze tender offers and defensive
160. Lipton suggests that management actions often do not impair shareholder return
·even when the tender offer is defeated, and offers a table of several illustrations where the
oost·tender offer market price was near or higher than the defeated offering price. Lip·
supra note 93, at 107. Lipton concluded that of the 36 unsolicited tender offers
and defeated by target management between 1976 and June 1979, "the
fthareholders of more than 50 percent of the targets are better off today than if the
l:clefeated tender offer had succeeded." I d. The difficulty with such evaluation arises both
the substantial lapse of time-several years in most cases- between the tender offer
current illustrative prices, as well as an implied assumption, impossible to confirm or
that shareholders who reinvested their proceeds received from the tender offers
the offers been successful) would not have an accumulated return greater than the
market price of target company shares.
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measures into traditional modes created in differing contexts, it may be
more appropriate to examine the validity of defensive measures within
the framework of the underlying transaction. Such analysis takes as its
starting point the nature and purpose of the tender offer. Fundamentally, a tender offer is equivalent to a private transaction in which a
potential purchaser offers terms and conditions governing the purchase
for acceptance or rejection by the potential seller. What transforms the
private, relatively unregulated one-on-one transaction 161 into a tender
offer subject to Williams Act provisions and to a host of adverse target
management reactions is the extension of the offer to all shareholders with
the consequent potentiality of a shift in control in the target company . 162
Shifts in control occur, of course, in private transactions. Such
private transactions between a single or small group of control shareholders
and a third party usually meet with no management opposition, manage. ment generaliy being synonymous with control shareholders. It is appropriate, indeed it may even be logically mandated, to question why a single,
controlling shareholder may sell his shares in a relatively unburdened transaction, while fractionalized, minority shareholders cannot do so collectively without overcoming substantial and costly impediments created by
an unhappy target management.
Corporate control may be transferred in several manners. A statutory
merger involves director approval because the merger may substantially
alter the capital structure and identity of the merged corporation. A sale of
a controlling block of shares, however, creates no change in corporate
structure, identity, or legal relationships. Thus, no state corporate code
provides for director approval as a condition precedent to a shareholder's
sale of controlling interest. If the transfer of shares by a single, dominant
shareholder is an individual judgment to pass corporate control to the purchaser, the transfer of shares through a tender offer is a collective judgment
161. Certain judicial and statutory standards apply to all sales of securities by insiders
or others possessing material information and under a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading, e.g., rule 10b-5. Common-law restraints have developed on the sale of shares by
controlling shareholders, e.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), and Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 272, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 793-94 (1969), and other judicially created standards have developed with
respect to potentially fraudulent conduct, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
498-501, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-14 (1969). Despite the imposing list of potential pitfalls,
the overwhelming bulk of daily transactions occur between traders for whom such restrictions have no applicability.
162. It was the spector of unregulated shifts in control, rather than broad-based offers
to shareholders at large, that appears to have been the primary purpose of the Williams
Act. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974). The court stated that
a corporation does not become a tender offeror simply by proposing a paper
exchange of securities. There must be contemplated some change in control. If
actual control does not shift, it is difficult to see why the shareholder needs the
protection of Section 14(e).
/d.
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by tendering shareholders to the same effect. The motivation behind each
of such transfers may be identical. It therefore makes little sense to attack
the motivation of minority shareholders as being based upon selfish,
monetary considerations alone, when the motivation of a controlling
shareholder may be equally susceptible to such challenge but is beyond
reproach except in limited circumstances. 165 Moreover, to the extent that
tender offers permit removal of inefficient management, the collective
action of tendering shareholders is in effect a vote of no confidence and provides a far more efficient means of changing management than the proxy
system.l&4
Regarding the tender offer as effecting a collective sale of control
suggests that defensive measures be judged by standards relevant to sale
of control transactions. The dual identity of purpose and effect between
individual and collective transfers causes inquiry into what limitations
applicable to the dominant shareholder are appropriately applicable in
the tender offer context. Alternatively, to what extent do specific defensive tactics by management place minority shareholders at an unreasonable disadvantage compared to the transferability rights of controlling
shareholders? It is submitted that the collective sale of control should be
restricted only to the extent of validly imposed restraints upon its individual counterpart, a conclusion stemming from the transactional nature
of the tender offer. The application of consistent standards to both individual and collective transfers of control is referred to in this Article as
the sale of control analogue. The premise of analogous treatment is that
defensive measures by target management are appropriate to the extent
that they are consistent with limitations imposed upon private transfers of
control and to the degree they do not reasonably impair the opportunity of
minority shareholders to make a collective sale of control as effectively as an
individual sale may be transacted. 165
163. See text accompanying notes 171-80 infra. Kaplan states:
[I)n very few instances is an obligation to act primarily for the benefit of the corporation at the expense of the majority shareholder's own interest imposed. For
example, it is seldom if ever held that ... he shall be restricted in selling his
control shares (other than to a looter or at a premium which constitutes a diversion of corporate advantage).
Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW.
883, 888 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
164. Brudney and Chirelstein comment:
Realistically, the tender-plus-merger procedure is merely a way of bypassing the
target company's proxy machinery, which is controlled by the incumbent
board, and submitting the acquisition proposal to direct referendum of the
stockholders. Those who accept the tender offer are properly to be regarded as
aye-voters, those who do not, as nay- or non-voters.
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1360
(1978). See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 12.5 (1972).
165. A significant difference between the sale of control by a single dominant
shareholder and sale by individual stockholders in the tender offer context is that, in the
latter situation, management acts as a surrogate for negotiating or affecting some matters
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The sale of control analogue is, it is submitted, the most appropriate
standard for judging defensive measures. It does not seek to impose standards developed from such historically differing contexts as the fiduciary
and statutory perspectives. More importantly, it treats the tender offer in
its essential characteristic- an offer to purchase directed to each
shareholder in his individual capacity. 166 The analogue focuses on alienability, a fundamental characteristic of the ownership of shares, and
eliminates the incongruity of restraints that management's defensive
measures have created between the alienability of majority and minority
shares. 167 A unified approach applies, individual shareholders possessing
no greater right to transmit control by acting in a collective manner
adverse to corporate interests than does the single, dominant shareholder. Nor is there less right, or conversely, greater justification for
management interference with decisionmaking for the minority rather
than the majority shareholder.
Distinctions unquestionably exist between factors influencing the
transference-of-control-judgment of the dominant shareholder and factors
affecting fractionalized shareholders acting in a de facto collective manner.
In the former instance, a controlling shareholder may have fostered relationships with corporate employees, suppliers, customers, minority shareholders, and other community interests-relationships the shareholder

II

,,

II

18

.·~

··'

that scattered shareholders are incapable of handling collectively. While this difference is
significant, it only goes to who raises the questions and not the judgments to be made.
Target management, for example, might negotiate with the acquiror regarding changes
in the price or other terms of the offer. Management might also institute litigation based
upon concerns of corporate waste. Management's role in these circumstances may be
appropriately regarded as facilitating resolution of the more fundamental issue, determined by shareholders alone, of accepting or rejecting the offer.
166. For Williams Act purposes the definition of tender offer goes well beyond the
essential characteristic noted in the text. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,
817 (S.D.N .Y. 1979). This is to be expected, for distinct issues are being considered. The
text seeks to consider the essential characteristic of a tender offer for the purpose of
evaluating management's defensive response. Statutory definition has sought to determine what combination of characteristics will trigger Williams Act procedures and
requirements. Characteristics such as premiums, contingencies, and limited time frames,
examined for Williams Act purposes, do not necessarily distinguish an individual sale of
control from the collective sale, as such factors may well be present in both circumstances.
Characteristics determining whether stockholders should come under the Williams Act
umbrella, designed to protect them from undue pressure, nondisclosure, and unequal
treatment by the tender offeror, do not necessarily apply in determining whether the
transaction may permissibly trigger a host of defensive reactions by target management.
It is, for example, a matter of relative indifference for defensive purposes whether the
potential acquiror is offering a premium for the purchase of shares. Indeed a common
reply by target management is that the premium is not adequate. The existence of a
premium, however, is a primary element in determining whether a tender offer exists for
Williams Act purposes.
167. See Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguard and Restraints-An Interest Analysis,
21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613, 678-79 (1970) (discussing the tender offer as a device for
providing equal opportunity for the sale of shares by both minority and majority
shareholders).
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may desire to assure are protected as part of the transference of control.
The dominant shareholder also presumably has the economic expertise
to determine whether the transfer will have deleterious effects upon corporate constituents. In the tender offer context, offerors may be able to
exert greater leverage over minority shareholders in determining issues of
price, number of shares to be purchased, conditional acceptances, and
other aspects of the offer. The differences, however, in knowledge and
perspective between control and noncontrol shareholders do not lead to
the conclusion that the latter should not enjoy similar decisionmaking
roles. Differences in knowledge may well be ameliorated by disclosure, and
the Williams Act has encouraged a greater flow of information to
shareholders. Concerns expressed for employee, customer, and community
interests 168 are protected by two independent sources: target management's injunctive efforts and the acquiring company's economic concerns. The former, however selfishly pursued, may raise issues of waste,
looting, and illegality analogous to concerns relevant to a majority
· shareholder's transference of control. 169 Even more protective of such
interests, and frequently overlooked in discussions regarding the feared
consequences of takeovers, are the economic interests of the acquiring
company that may and probably will be quite inimical to substantial
disruptions in employee morale, supplier and trade relationships, and
the nonproductive use of acquired assets. Concerns for corporate and
shareholder welfare based on the disparity in knowledge and position
between control and noncontrol shareholders are thus substantially
resolved by the impact of disclosure, the availability of judicial scrutiny,
and the commonality of target-acquiror economic interests.l1°
168. See note 71 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 176-80 infra.
170. The sale of control analogue may be viewed as a neutral perspective with regard
to the appropriate scope of limitations upon the actions of controlling shareholders, relying principally on a premise that whatever such limitations are they should be analogously
applied to the collective action of individual shareholders in a tender offer context. A
judgmental response may be that current limitations on controlling shareholders are
tinsufficient to protect the broad range of corporate and community interests, therefore
argument based solely on analogy to current standards fails to address underlying issues
of values and goals. To some extent the argument would be valid, for this Article does not
purport to examine current limitations on controlling shareholders from social and
~economic perspectives. That is not to say, however, that reliance upon current standards
is without unarticulated major premises that adopt policies supporting the scope of such
limitations. One premise is the acceptance of standards that deny free alienability of
shares where the result may be economically damaging to nonparticipatory shareholders
and corporate creditors. An independent premise adopts in a broad sense the values of
competitive enterprise, thus limiting the alienability of shares in circumstances where antitrust concerns have appropriate dominance. A third, perhaps
fundamental, premise regards current limitations as consistent with a presumptive
of alienability of shares, imposing upon third parties the burden of advancing
:;arguments based upon competing values and claims. The analogue is thus not without
l."iudi!Dlental aspects, although such premises are generally tangential to the theses of this
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Limitations upon the Sale of Controlling Interests

Limitations upon the sale of control shares are narrowly drawn, consistent with judicial concerns regarding restraints upon alienability. Twentyfive years have passed since Perlman v. Feldmann, 171 yet that apparently
ground-breaking decision has failed to produce substantial litigation
challenging sales of control. Contrary to the efforts of some commentators
to give expansive interpretations to Perlman, 172 the Second Circuit has
regarded Perlman in the narrow context of its somewhat unusual factual
situation. That court's characterization of Perlman seven years after the
decision "was basically that the controlling shareholders in selling control
to a potential customer had appropriated to their personal benefit a corporate asset: the premium which the company's product could command
in a time of market shortage." 173 Perlman has thus not created a substantial restraint upon the sale of control shares, and may be viable only in
the relatively infrequent instances of clearly identifiable corporate opportunities inuring to the principal benefit of selling shareholders.m Such a
limitation would have rare application in the tender offer context where
the offered premium extends to all shareholders, each shareholder thus
given the right to share proportionately in the premium representing
transference of control. 175
171. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
172. See generally Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale
of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 1212 (1958).
173. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
174. In a fairly narrow reading of Perlman, it has been suggested that the case is simply
an illustration of the "looting" standard arising from such cases as Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28
N.Y.S.2d 622, 652-53 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 986, 988-90 (1957).
175. The Perlman decision has been used to suggest that the controlling shareholder
should seek to obtain for the minority shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares
upon the same tenns offered to the controlling shareholder. This obligation has been
implied by some commentators based upon a broad reading of Perlman. Andrews, The
Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505,
515 (1965); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1222 (1958);
Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 31 (1956). But Perlman has
not evolved in this direction and the position has generally been rejected. Clagett v.
Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978); Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309
F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Yerke v. Batman, 376
N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). California courts, however, appear more prone
·to accept an "equal opportunity" doctrine, particularly where arguably undue advantage
has inured to the controlling shareholder. In Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969), the court referred to the articles cited in note 172 supra and suggested that the growth in shareholder population and need for continual investment "may
in the future require legislative action or the adoption by the courts of one or the other
law writer's recommendations for the investor's protection." Id. at 271, 76 Cal. Rptr. at
793. Similar concerns in a somewhat different context are evident in the obligations
imposed upon controlling shareholders in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93,
111-12, 460 P.2d 464, 473-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 601-02 (1969). However valid or
desirable "equal opportunity" arguments appear, they have little relevance in the tender
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More relevant to tender offers is the common-law limitation prohibiting or imposing liability upon the sale of controlling interests in circumstances where a "looting" or other usurpation of corporate assets by the
acquiror is reasonably foreseeable. Decisions in this area have generally
dealt with companies owning highly liquid assets and have turned upon
whether the sellers could reasonably have perceived the risk that corporate assets would be wasted or otherwise exploited by the acquiring
party. 176 Perception of this risk must arise from facts known to the
seller, 177 for there does not appear to be an affirmative duty upon sellers
to investigate the character or intentions of the purchaser. 178 Although
case law has generally developed through derivative actions against
former controlling shareholders, management may seek injunctive relief
"if the circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer would alert
suspicion in a prudent man that the purchasers are an irresponsible
group who will mismanage and loot the corporate assets." 179 Looting and
waste ordinarily have narrow connotations, but it would be entirely consistent to apply such standards to instances of alleged statutory illegality,
thus including antitrust and regulatory violations. Management is aided
in its ability to perceive potential misuse of target assets through the
disclosure obligations of the Williams Act, including disclosure of the
source of funds, plans regarding potential merger, liquidation, sale of
assets, and board changes, as well as any other material effects upon the
target company's corporate structure and business. 180
The foregoing restraints on alienation of controlling interests are
minimal. Corporate and minority shareholder interests are regarded as sufficiently protected as long as the selling shareholder does not appropriate
through the sales price the value of a corporate asset, and has no reasonable
offer context where offers are open to all shareholders on identical terms, Williams Act §
14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)(1976), and shares may be rejected only on a pro rata
basis. Williams Act§ 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
176. lnsuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 27 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 629 (Sup. Ct. 1941), noted in 26 MINN. L.
REv. 118 (1941). See generally Hazen, Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-and a
Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1977).
177. In DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr.
554 (1975), the court upheld a derivative action against the seller of control where the
court found that the seller became directly aware of facts that would have alerted a prudent person that the purchaser was "likely to loot the corporation." /d. at 697, 120 Cal.
. Rptr. at 360.
178. In Levy v. American Beverage Corp., the court stated:
The law does not require one to act on the assumption that a person with whom
a business transaction, even of a large amount, is had, will commit a fraudulent
or criminal act if given the opportunity to do so. Quite the contrary may be
assumed, in the absence of actual notice.
265 A.D. 208, 219, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517, 527 (1942). See also Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480
F.2d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 1973).
179. McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (lOth Cir. 1969).
180. Schedule 14 D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1979).
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grounds to suspect that the acquiror will engage in corporate looting or
other waste. In the absence of legitimate concerns by target management
about either of these potentialities, considering as well questions of
magnitude and subsequent availability of judicial relief, fractionalized
shareholders acting as a collective majority should have no additional
impediments placed upon their judgments regarding transference of
shares. Corporate interests and remaining minority shareholders require
no greater protection in the context of collective, rather than unitary,
decisionmaking. Employing such a conclusion as the premise of the sale
of control analogue, it is appropriate to examine specific defensive
measures in light of the analogue standard.

C.

Applicatz"on of the Sale of Control Analogue to Defensive Measures

Evaluating specific defensive measures in the perspective of relatively
circumscribed common-law restraints on the sale of control indicates that
some defensive tactics are consistent with alienability rights accorded control shares, while other measures unreasonably impinge upon transferability and exceed protections developed at common law. In particular,
the sale of control analogue may be examined with regard to the following defensive techniques.

1.

Amendments to Articles of Incorporation

A controlling shareholder is not likely to be faced with charter or
by-law restraints that may impede the sale of control. It would be quite
extraordinary to expect the controlling shareholder to tie his own hands or
limit his own transferability by charter provisions requiring supermajority
votes in excess of his own voting strength. What the controlling
shareholder is unlikely to impose upon himself is nevertheless imposed
upon a fractionalized minority through supermajority provisions that
effectively preclude the possibility of merger and therefore create in
management or recalcitrant shareholders a virtual veto over unwanted
tender offers. 181
The justification for supermajority voting restraints imposed by
charter amendment is their adoption by the shareholders, who
presumably have knowledge of the effect that such provisions will have in
discouraging potential tender offerors. 182 This justification, however,
does not address a more fundamental issue: what protections are appropriate to assure that supermajority provisions do not unreasonably
restrict future conduct desired by a majority of the shareholders?
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181. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
182. The SEC requires through proxy regulation a justification by management of
charter amendments that would impede or discourage tender offer efforts. Exchange Act
Release 34-15230, Oct. 13, 1978 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
81, 748. The disclosure requirement has not proven a deterrent to management in the
pursuit of such antitender offer measures.
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Although such provisions are generally adopted by only a majority vote
of shareholders pursuant to statutory provision, 183 any attempted amendment or repeal requires a supermajority vote equivalent to the underlying
merger requirement. 184 The effective result is that future majorities are
locked into the supermajority provision, unable to overcome what may
be the "dead hand" of prior shareholders who approved the amendments
but sold their shares long before the emergence of a viable acquiring candidate.185 The result of supermajority provisions is that a shifting,
perhaps no longer identifiable, majority of shareholders acting in far different circumstances has effectively precluded current tender offers
without management approval. Inefficient management is thus able to
utilize corporate machinery to insulate itself from challenge. 186
Although corporate codes universally permit supermajority provisions, it may be questioned whether statutory interpretation permits such
provisions to be adopted by any vote less than the proposed supermajority
percentage. 187 The eighty percent provision of Gulton Industries, Inc.
18~. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(1) (Supp. 1978) (requires board approval
followed by approval by "a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon.").
The articles of incorporation may require a greater vote than the statutory standard.
Imposing a supermajority voting requirement upon a supermajority charter proposal
would impose a substantial solicitation burden for numerous corporations, particularly
those with diverse, highly fragmented shareholder groups.
184. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
185. The "dead hand" argument is not applicable where shareholder approval of
restrictive charter provisions occurs during the pendency of a tender offer. See, e.g.,
Labaton v. Universal LeafTabacco Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
, 96,94~ (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Although shareholder approval of amendments in such circumstances is equivalent to a rejection of the tender offer, adoption should nevertheless
require supermajority approval as the provisions create future prophylactic effects.
186. See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977), in which it is argued that supermajority provisions.
are contrary to the basic principles of corporate democracy, for they permit
incumbent management to control a corporation long after it has lost the support of its shareholders. In addition . . . [such] provisions . . . transform the will
of the majority into what may be described as the tyranny of the minority, by
permitting that minority to block significant changes in the corporation that are
supported by a majority of the shareholders.
Id. at 195. In what is surely an aberrational reversal of roles, the management of U.S.
Home Corporation recommended to its shareholders in 1979 the repeal of a 75% supermajority provision adopted as a defensive measure in 1975. Management's proxy statement noted that the supermajority provisions "reflect a defensive posture which is neither
consistent with the Company's current philosophy nor in tune with current concepts of
corporate governance .... In addition, such provisions place excessive power in the hands
of management .... " The proxy statement is extracted in A. FLEISCHER. supra note 18,
at ~90-41,-42.
187. Whether supermajority provisions may be validly adopted by less than a supermajority vote has not been directly litigated. Fleischer refers to "sparse case law on the
propriety of these charter and by-law amendments, either as a matter of fiduciary concern or with respect to compliance with 'technical' provisions." A. FLEISCHER, supra note
18, at 1~ (footnote omitted). Indeed, "sparse" is an overstatement as to any direct
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was adopted by a fifty-four percent shareholder vote . 188
shareholders in Seibert v. Culton Industn'es did not challenge the
ciency of the vote. 189 Rather, they focused on the Board of
discretionary authority to reduce the required percentage vote
eighty percent to a simple majority by Board approval of a pn:>p<>&e(f.
takeover prior to the offeror's acquisition of a five percent
interest. 190 Although the court's decision upholding the alternative
percentage provision may impliedly be read to support the validity of
underlying shareholder vote, the validity of that vote was not at issue.
Delaware precedent may not be lacking should such validity be challenged.
Cases involving the reduction of prior rights of shareholders indicate the
inability of one group of shareholders or management to unilaterally
acquire an improved position relative to nonconsenting shareholders. In
Telvest, Inc. v-. Olson, 191 a defensive effort by target management to issue
to all common stockholders preferred shares containing supermajority
terms for the approval of certain merger, sales of assets, or similar transactions was held to violate plaintiff's voting rights despite plaintiffs equal
treatment with all other shareholders. 192 The acts of the Board of Directors
were purportedly consistent with its statutory and charter authority to issue
preferred shares and set the terms thereof. 195 Nevertheless, this action
resulted in "an alteration of the voting powers of the common stock" 194 such
that plaintiffs twenty percent interest no longer carried the same strength
to influence merger votes as existed prior to the issuance of the preferred
shares. 195
The Telvest decision suggests that a similar "alteration of voting
powers" argument may apply to the adoption of supermajority provisions
by less than a supermajority vote. The adoption in Seibert effectively
aggrandized a fifty-four percent decision into an eighty percent decision
that could not be altered without an eighty percent approval. Thus, the
forty-six percent of the Gulton Industries shareholders who opposed or
abstained from voting in favor of the supermajority provision must now
convince not five percent, but an additional thirty-four percent of the
challenge of validity. The issue of what vote is necessary to adopt a supermajority provision is discussed in Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-Law
Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 545 (1979), but the authors inconclusively suggest only
that "an element of judgment is involved; a 70% supermajority requirement can probably be adopted by a smaller stockholder vote than a 90% supermajority requirement."
/d. at 546.
188. See Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 79-5631, at 2 (Del. Ch., filed June 21,
1979).
189. /d. at 3.
190. /d. at 3-4.
191. No. 79-5798 (Del. Ch., filed March 8, 1979).
192. /d. at 7-8, 14.
193. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1974).
194. No. 79-5798 (Del. Ch., filed March 8, 1979).
195. /d.
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shares to repeal the provision should an attractive merger partner appear.
This is a far heavier burden than management's task of achieving adoption of the antitakeover provision through only a fifty-four percent vote.
Additional statutory support for requiring a supermajority vote of
adoption may be garnered from the provision in some corporate codes
requiring the same supermajority vote to alter, amend, or repeal the particular provision. 196 The legislative policy thus reflected is that a matter
considered by an earlier group of shareholders to be sufficiently important
to require supermajority approval should not be subject to the shifting,
subsequent tides of any lesser number. It would not be unreasonable to
regard this legislative policy as containing an implicit presumption that the
original adoption of the provision likewise was not the result of a temporary,
shifting, simple majority, but was instead the overwhelming choice of
shareholders knowingly imposing restrictions upon their statutorily
granted voting powers. 197
Insistence upon a vote in excess of the minimum statutory standard is
not without precedent. In Seagrave Corp. v. Mount ,1 98 shareholder
approval of a charter amendment having substantial control and conflictof-interest ramifications was rejected by the court disregarding the votes of
interested shareholders. The votes of the noninterested shareholders controlled, notwithstanding the fact that only approximately six percent of the
total vote was in opposition to the amendment. 199 The court's action was
based entirely on equitable grounds, as no statutory authority existed for
the nonrecognition of the votes of interested shareholders. 200
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196. See note 25 supra.
197. If a supermajority vote for adoption were the norm, evasion may be sought
through reincorporation, requiring only a majority vote with supermajority provisions
already written into the articles of the survivor corporation. Such efforts might be subject
to challenge, however, as lacking a legitimate business purpose other than the avoidance
of the higher shareholder approval that would otherwise be required.
198. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954). Disregarding the 43,000 shares voted by the
'interested shareholders, the amendment received 53,979 affirmative votes, falling short of
the 61,351 votes required to achieve a statutory majority. I d. at 397. The court may have
been unduly harsh in not reducing the required majority to a figure based upon the
shares of noninterested shareholders. Avoidance of the statutory standard on equitable
grounds was made even clearer in the district court opinion, which stated that "the
approval by the majority of the stockholders of the proposed plan which is in violation of
the principles of equity, is not binding upon the stockholders of the corporation." Mount
v. Seagrave Corp., 112 F. Supp. 330, 334 (S.D. Ohio 1953).
199. See 212 F.2d at 397.
200. See Cary, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management, 25 Bus. LAW. 839
(1970). Cary states:
I raise the question . . . whether a majority of shareholders . . . may create a
super-majority requirement. Certainly I have no actual case in mind that would
lead me to say that it is invalid. I do have in mind some statutes in this field particularly relating to the New York Business Corporation Act, which permits [sic]
more than so-called majority requirements in other areas. They in effect require
that such a provision can only be created by a super·majority as well.
at 840. Professor Cary presumably had in mind§ 616 of the New York Business Cor-
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Corporate democracy as a means of reflecting changing consensus,
as well as the need to facilitate corporate response to altered conditions,
are objectives frustrated by supermajority charter provisions that prevent
a majority shareholder interest from acting. Turnover rates among
shareholders within particular corporations may not be readily available,
but it is reasonable to surmise that for many corporations an active
market will have the cumulative, relatively frequent effect of a change in
identity and a significant shift in percentage of ownership of shares. 201
The transient nature of stock ownership, coupled with the evanescent
quality of a majority block of shares, suggest the need for substantial
safeguards before past judgments are permitted to preclude current decisions favored by a majority of shareholders. Supermajority provisions
may render shareholders-and even management-powerless to react to
changed economic conditions, however material their impact. The
amending process is intended to facilitate timely corporate reaction to
fluctuating conditions; it is not a process designed for strangulating
obstinacy or enshrining irrevocable veto rights. If supermajority provisions are to be permitted, minimum safeguards and policy concerns support the requirement of adoption by no less than an equally supermajority
vote. 202

2.

Issuance of Shares

In the absence of an announced or threatened takeover effort, decisions by target management to issue shares to ESOTs, employees, suppliers,
or other third parties are appropriately evaluated by such standards as con·
flict of interest, adequacy of consideration, reasonableness in light of
capital structure, and similar traditional concerns. Where the issuance has
poration law which, unlike the simple majority provision for other charter amendments,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 803 (McKinney Supp. 1980), requires a two-thirds approval for
charter amendments that increase statutorily prescribed voting majorities. /d. § 616
(McKinney 1963). An indirect effort to dissuade the adoption of supermajority provisions
is the position of the Wisconsin Department of Securities that it may not permit the
registration of shares by any corporation whose charter contains a supermajority provision. Bartell, WiSconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1468 (1977). This
administrative judgment does not go to the validity or invalidity of such provisions but
appears premised upon a notion of fairness to the holders of equity securities.
201. A 1971 SEC study of institutional investor trading indicated a steady annual rise
in block trades of 10,000 shares or more, with over 15,000 of such trades occurring in
1970. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM·
MISSION, REPORT 1546, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, at 1546, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
202. Policy concerns militating against supermajority provisions suggest an argument
of per se invalidity rather than, as proposed in this Article, requiring that such provisions
·gamer supermajority approval. Per se invalidity, however, faces the insuperable burden
of universal statutory recognition of the right of shareholders to adopt voting requirements in excess of statutory minimums. Indeed such may be the preferred course in some
circumstances, for example close corporations. This Article has therefore adopted a more
limited, pragmatic approach, one that is believed to be consistent with both statutory and
policy concerns.
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not effected a material shift in control, management's action may be
accorded appropriate presumptions. However, any presumption favoring
management is subject to the availability of judicial relief, if appropriate, as well as to the statutory right of shareholders to change management if dissatisfied with its use of corporate power.
A different set of concerns arises when the issuance of shares affects
control or is concurrent with an announced or threatened takeover
effort. 208 The sale of control analogue may provide appropriate
guidance. A controlling shareholder faced with a premium offer for the
purchase of his shares would be unlikely to cause the corporation to issue
shares that might create a veto block over any eventual merger or other
reorganization. Even if the particular offer is not favored, creation of an
independent, negative block diminishes the prospects for future, potentially more favorable offers.
In order to permit individual, noncontrolling shareholders to enjoy
rights of transferability analogous to a dominant shareholder, a corporate
issuance of shares during a tender offer time frame, or any issuance otherwise materially affecting control, should be subject to prior approval of
shareholders. Such approval would necessarily involve full disclosure of
203. The shift in evaluative context between control and noncontrol situations is
illustrated by Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill.
1969). In 1965, Goodrich and Gulf Chemicals, Inc., engaged in a joint venture, considered having one party buy out the other's interest but negotiations failed for lack of
agreement on price. Id. at 708. Such prospect apparently was not raised again until
January 1969 when Northwest Industries announced its intention to make a tender offer
for Goodrich shares. Id. Negotiations between Goodrich and Gulf immediately recommenced, and after only one day of negotiations Goodrich agreed to buy out Gulfs interest
by the exchange of $35,000,000 of Goodrich common stock for Gulfs share. Id. The
court noted that "although the officers of both Goodrich and Gulf claim there was no
mutual agreement to defeat plaintiffs takeover bid, there was a remarkable empathy
between the companies." Id. at 712. Despite these "remarkable" circumstances, the court
applied traditional business judgment standards in evaluating the defensive issuance of
shares, totally ignoring the dynamics of the battle for control and the effects of such issuance upon the entrenchment of Goodrich management. Id.; see note 87 supra. Business
judgment presumptions may have been validly invoked had the 1965 negotiations been
concluded and challenged, but in the context of a 1969 tender offer battle such presumptions were unduly charitable to target management. Fairly unusual circumstances were
present in Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth Inc., No. 80-7865 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 1980), in
which Crouse-Hinds found itself the target of an unwanted tender offer subsequent to its
announced proposed merger with Belden Corp. See note 133 supra. The Second Circuit
.determined that the business judgment presumption protected target management in
their efforts to go forward with the merger, despite the merger's negative effects upon the
proposed tender offer. The decision is reasonable in its narrow context, for the mere
occurrence of a tender offer should not affect the burden of proof as to the validity of
measures generally consistent with prior approved plans. Using a sale of control analogue,
management's decision to merge was pursuant to authority acknowledged by CrouseHinds shareholders. As long as management was acting in good faith and without
knowledge of an imminent tender offer, a presumption of business regularity should not
be avoided simply because the shareholders are now confronted with a tender offer
opportunity.
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the reasons and consequences of the issuance of shares, including the
potential inhibiting of pending or imminent tender offers. 2°4 While
shareholder votes may be strongly influenced by management's control of
the proxy machinery, shareholder consciousness will be considerably
elevated by full disclosure in a tender offer context. A decision in such
circumstances to issue additional shares to third parties who may be
antagonistic to the tender offer is equivalent to a collective rejection of,
or at least a judgment to impede, the offer. The sale of control analogue
thus premises shareholder approval of the issuance of shares upon two
factors: the recognition that an issuance of shares may effectively under·
cut or preclude a tender offer from proceeding, and a model that regards
individual shareholders as possessing the right to make a collective judgment equivalent to the right enjoyed by a single control shareholder or
group of dominant shareholders.2° 5
Focusing upon shareholder approval and disclosure aspects would
relieve courts from the mysteries of determining "primary" purposes or
the bona fides of stated management concerns. The advantage of an
alternative approach is illustrated by Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen. 206
Although the plaintiff shareholder owned fifty-two percent of the outstanding shares, it did not control the Board of Directors at the time the
Board chose to issue a substantial block of shares that would have reduced
plaintiff's holding to thirty-four percent and shifted control to the corporate president. 207 Relying upon a "primary purpose" approach,2° 8 the
court concluded that the purported basis for issuance of the shares, an
204. In instances where a tender offer has not yet been made for purposes of the
Williams Act, the inchoate nature of the offer should not excuse a lack of full disclosure
of all the information relevant to such potential offer. Nondisclosure of such information
may well violate rule 14(a)-9 of the proxy regulations. At state court levels, it may be
hoped that the notions of nondisclosure have.advanced beyond the limited view expressed .
in America~ Hard.ware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (Sup.
Ct. 1957), m wh1ch the court concluded that a potential tender offer was "wholly
unrelated" to the proposed issuance of shares for which stockholder approval was sought, ·
thereby denying plaintiffs request for an injunction based upon the inadequacy of the
proxy statement to disclose the potential tender offer. /d. at 64, 136 A.2d at 693.
·
205. Shareholder approval of the issuance or repurchase of shares in a defensive context would not preclude minority shareholder objections based upon traditional grounds
such as insufficiency of consideration received for shares issued or excessive consideration
for shares repurchased. Nothing short of unanimous shareholder consent would preclude
such actions. See Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 74, 90 A.2d 652,
656 (1952).
206. 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976).
207. /d. at 206.
208. The court reasoned:
It is basic, of course, that directors or officers who cause unissued or treasury
shares to be issued to themselves or others solely for the purpose of obtaining or
maintaining control of the corporation breach their fiduciary duty to the
shareholders.
Id. at 207.
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extinguishment of a debt owed to the president by the corporation, was
undermined by serious questions regarding the validity and amount of such
debt. 209 These deficiencies led to the conclusion that the issue of control,
rather than the bona fides of the debt, motivated the issuance of shares. 210
The unfortunate implication is that, had the debt been sufficiently
established, the shift in control might have been accomplished despite
shareholder objection. If directors' actions are upheld under business judgment considerations whenever there is "any rational business purpose," 211
the extinguishment of a legitimate debt may well suffice, despite effects
upon control or the availability of alternative, noncontroversial measures.
Mandating shareholder approval in control situations, including imminent
tender offer contexts, avoids the hair-splitting problems created by
"primary," "sole," "bona fides," and similar ambiguous standards. 212
Shareholder approval of corporate actions during the pendency of
tender offers is the accepted norm in England, pursuant to the City Code
on Take-Overs and Mergers. 215 Among the General Principles of the
Code, regarded as "good standards of commercial behavior, " 21 • is the provision that, during the pendency of an actual or imminent offer, no action
may be taken by the Board without the approval of shareholders that
"could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the
shareholders of the offeree company being denied an opportunity to
decide on its merits." 215 The limitation on Board activity is further
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209. Id.
210. ld. at 207-08.
211. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977).
212. The duality of the fiduciary concept is reflected by the Board's argument in
Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976), that "the Board felt that
it was in the best interests of all stockholders to perpetuate Mr. Scallen's involvement with
the ice show business of the defendant corporation and anticipated that plaintiffs would
terminate Mr. Scallen." Id. at 207 n.3. Is this not a judgment that the corporation and
shareholders would be harmed by a sudden change in management, and is not such judgment appropriate within the fiduciary model? If so, as many would argue, then does the
fiduciary concern with corporate welfare permit action otherwise barred by the fiduciary
limitation upon measures taken to perpetuate control? The conflict created by fiduciary
concepts is not resolved except by arbitrary presumptions of priority.
213. The City Code, which does not have the force of law, but is intended to govern
commercial behavior in the securities market, is issued under the authority of the City
Working Party, a representative body of banking and investment interests established by
the governors of the Bank of England to consider good business practice and the conduct
of tender offers and mergers. THE CITY CODE ON T AKE-0VERS AND MERGERS (Rev. Apr.
1976).
214. Id. at 4.
215. ld. General Principle No. 4, at 12 states:
At no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to the board of an
offeree company or after the board of an offeree company has reason to believe
that a bona fide offer might be imminent shall any action be taken by the board
of the offeree company in relation to the affairs of the company, without the
approval in general meeting of the shareholders of the offeree company, which
could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the
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[1981]

specified in rule 38 of the Code, in which shareholder approval is expressly
required for the issuance of any shares, the issuance or grant of options or
convertible rights, the sale of a material amount of assets, and any other
contract not in the ordinary course of business. 216
Although the scope of the English model may not appeal in all of its
aspects to authorities on this side of the Atlantic, its basic philosophy is
consistent with the sale of control analogue and the avoidance of
discriminatory treatment between control and noncontrolling shareholders. To those who argue that shareholders will uniformly reject
regardl~ss of merit corporate transactions that impinge upon the tender
offer, it should be noted that both the English and proposed models provide for shareholder consideration of the merits of the issuance of shares,
not a shareholder vote on acceptance or rejection of the tender offer. 217
Moreover, it would be inappropriate to place upon noncontrolling
shareholders presumptions and burdens that exceed limitations placed
upon sales of control by dominant shareholders. The latter are free, subject to the noted limitations, 218 to sell their shares pursuant to their own
financial interests. Noncontrolling shareholders, therefore, should not be
denied the opportunity to approve or reject defensive measures simply
because they too may be motivated by personal financial interests. 219
shareholders of the offeree company being denied an opportunity to decide on
its merits.
216. Id. at 30-31.
217. The arguments in Lipton, supra note 93, at 123-24, against a shareholder
referendum on tender offers presumed that the sole issue before shareholders is the acceptance or rejection of the offer. The English and proposed models both regard the tender
offer as a matter of disclosure. Primary emphasis in such votes will be upon the merits of
the proposed transaction, a somewhat different context, although admittedly one that
would undoubtfully be influenced by the effect that the transaction would have on the
impending offer.
218. See notes 171-80 supra and accompanying text.
219. Required shareholder approval of an increase in authorized shares indirectly
places the question of issuance before the shareholders. Often, however, corporations are
organized with or develop a surplus of authorized but unissued shares for indeterminate,
future purposes, and shareholder approval in calmer times is given without attention to
the ultimate use of such shares to thwart takeover bids or aggrandize management control. There is little logical basis for permitting management of Corporation X with an
excess of authorized, unissued shares unilaterally to use such shares for defensive purposes
without shareholder approval, while management of Corporation Y, enjoying no such
excess, must obtain shareholder approval in the context of full disclosure of purpose and
effect. The former simply rewards management foresight, at the considerable expense of
abusing the good faith of shareholder approval. The district court in Treadway Cos.
v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH),
97,603 (2d Cir. 1980), was notably disturbed by the repeated efforts of target management to issue shares in a manner "so as to avoid shareholder scrutiny." Id. at 686. The
issuance created a market shift in control, yet the court of appeals inexplicably failed to
recognize that management's conduct substantially distorted any original purpose for the·
authorization of such shares and, indeed, would not have been possible but for the fortuitous existence of an excess in authorized shares. See note 112 supra.
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3.

Repurchase of Shares

Decisionmaking authority for corporate repurchase of shares is ordinarily vested in the board of directors, as statutory provisions confer no
express powers to shareholders relative to such decisions. uo Repurchase
programs may be based upon a variety of legitimate purposes, such as
reduction in excess capitalization, obtaining shares for stock option or
other use, and investment motivations when directors regard the corporate stock as undervalued. Regardless of purpose, however, repurchases may have the effect of aggrandizing the percentage of shares held
by management or insiders to a dominant position or an effective veto
power.m A control shareholder, recognizing such possibilities, is not
likely to permit the board to undertake a repurchase program that would
seriously impede his ability to transfer his shares by creating an antagonistic minority block capable of vetoing merger or other reorganization
plans. zu Noncontrol shareholders should be no less protected. Thus,
under a sale of control analogue, any repurchase program that carries
the possibility of a substantial increase in management's percentage
holding, or creates a veto power within management, should be subject
to shareholder approval following full disclosure of control consequences.
It may be anticipated that shareholders will uniformly approve repurchase programs in nontender offer contexts. Approval, however, will be
much more difficult to obtain where the program may seriously impair
announced or imminent tender offers. us
The likelihood or probability of shareholder rejection of defensive
measures taken during a tender offer contest are not grounds for denying
a decisionmaking role to noncontrolling holders, for it may be no less
probable that a dominant shareholder would preclude the adoption of
restraints in similar circumstances. Where reasonable concern over the
220. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1975); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 6
(1975).
221. See, e.g., note 40 supra (discussion on the repurchase program of Marriott Corporation).
222. For example, suppose there is a dominant 50% shareholder and a 30% minority
block, along with a statutory provision requiring two-thirds majority approval of a
merger. A repurchase program of ll% of the outstanding shares, assuming all shares
are tendered by neutral shareholders, would result in the minority block owning in
excess of one-third of the outstanding shares, thus being capable of vetoing any merger
proposal. The dominant shareholder, through control of the board, would assure that the
risk of such a repurchase program is avoided.
223. The recommended shareholder approval of all repurchase programs contrasts
with the recommendation of shareholder approval of issuances of shares only occurring
during an actual or pending tender offer. See text accompanying note 205 supra. The
disparity results from the effect of such varying defensive measures. Repurchase programs
may create an effective veto block within management that will IJ.Ot be overcome by any
subsequent corporate action without management approval. The issuance of additional
shares, however, may raise the total cost of a tender offer but may not so definitively
create an effective foreclosure. Third party recipients of shares, however supportive they
may be of management, may in time sell their shares to other parties or succumb to
favorable market or tender offer conditions.
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future corporate welfare exists, management's concerns should be tested
in an independent forum, analogous to derivative actions that may be
brought against controlling shareholders. For example, the repurchase of
shares by management from the potential acquiror in Kors v. Careym
may have been necessary to protect the goodwill and customer relations
of the target corporation. It is possible that, if given the opportunity,
shareholders would have disapproved the repurchase on the premise that
the repurchase denied an opportunity for a premium sale of their shares.
Inferences and assumptions about shareholder judgment, however, are
inadequate bases to preclude shareholder involvement in favor of
unilateral management action. If potential misuse, waste, or other
serious concern reasonably exists-as it may have in Kors v. Carey-with
regard to potential control of corporate assets by the acquiror, the proper
response is not to deny shareholder involvement in decisionmaking, but
rather to emphasize the right of management to seek an injunction
against the acquisition of control. Litigation would focus attention upon
the alleged potentialities of misuse in a context directly analogous to
common-law limitations on the sale of control. Management, acting on
behalf of the corporation, would seek to enjoin a collective sale of control
on the grounds that the sale of shares cannot be made in circumstances
indicating a significant danger of misuse or waste of corporate assets by
the acquiring company.
The proposed approach substantially equates the transferability
rights of controlling and noncontrolling shareholders, permitting the latter the same opportunity to influence decisions affecting their abilities to
sell as enjoyed by dominant shareholders. Concerns for corporate wellbeing would be met not by unilateral management actions to issue or
repurchase shares, but rather through litigation to enjoin the acquisition
based upon standards discussed in the following section. 225

I,

I'

224. 39 Del. Ch. 47, 53, 158 A.2d 136, 139 (1960).
225. In Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), the court denied the tender
offeror's motion for preliminary injunction against a competing repurchase offer institu·
ted defensively by target corporation. /d. at 490. There was no explicit finding about cor·
porate purpose other than a concem that the tender offer price was too low. A r~purchase
program unilaterally adopted by target management in opposition to an announced offer
may create for shareholders two offers rather than one. However, it does not follow that
shareholders are therefore not adversely affected by target's competing offer. Where the
target corporation, by acquiring a fairly limited number of shares, increases the percen·
tage holding of shares of management to the point of an effective veto power, see text
accompanying notes 39-41 supra, a target offer limited in scope may have the effect of
eliminating, not enlarging, the transferability opportunities of shareholders. Although
blocking of shareholder opportunity was apparently not involved in Mite Corp. v. Dixon,
where the repurchase offer was for 350,000 shares, approximately 40% of the outstanding
shares, competing tender offers by target corporation should not be regarded as favorable
to shareholders in all circumstances. The text's recommendation of shareholder approval
is an appropriate safeguard against repurchases that may create the adverse consequences
noted.
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4.

Litigation

The sale of control analogue does not deny target management, acting on behalf of the corporation, the ability to initiate injunction proceedings against the pending or proposed tender offer. Such actions,
brought to safeguard the interests of nontendering shareholders as well as
the corporate entity, are analogous to derivative actions brought by
minority shareholders on behalf of the corporation to enjoin a dominant
shareholder's sale of control. Management's authority, however, extends
beyond raising issues similar to such common-law and equitable
restraints upon the transference of control. It also encompasses a protective role for tendering shareholders, unable because of their fragmentation to litigate in a· collective manner, to assure adherence, where
material, to the statutory safeguards of the Williams Act, zu state antitakeover statutes, and other statutes such as the Investment Company
Act, ZZ 7 the Interstate Commerce Act, 228 and regulations regarding the
use of loans to finance tender offers. 229
Antitrust litigation requires particular consideration, owing to its
prevalence, potentiality for burdensome delays, and the ability of the
target to manufacture claims through defensive acquisitions. Marshall
Field, for example, sought to bootstrap its antitrust claims against a proposed Carter Hawley Hale tender offer by a hurried acquisition of
additional stores. 230 Moreover, Marshall Field directors failed to direct
adequate attention to whether potential antitrust problems were
resolvable by the acquiring company. 231 These factors, coupled with the
substantial expenditures of corporate funds created by antitrust litigation, suggest that relatively high standards should apply prior to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. In particular:
226. Williams Act, see note 1 supra, requirements of timely filing of schedules 13d and
14d, together with statutory requirements in § 14(e) of full disclosure of all material
aspects of the offer, were designed principally for the protection of the target
shareholders. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977). Shareholders anxious to accept a premium offer are not likely to initiate litigation. Management therefore
is necessarily thrust into the role of enforcing Williams Act rc;quirements. Similar concerns involve potential violations under rule 10b-5, although the disclosure obligations
under§ 14e appear to have rendered superfluous rule 10b-5 considerations. R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 737 (4th ed. 1977).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1976); see Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp .. 296 F. Supp.
470, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
228. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1976); see B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d
1349, 1351 (3d Cir. 1970).
229. 12 C.F.R. §§ 207, 220 (1980); see Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica
Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
230. During the pendency of its antitrust claim Marshall Field entered into agreements
to acquire five Liberty House stores in Tacoma, Washington and Portland, Oregon, and
a shopping complex in Houston, Texas. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp.
1168, 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
231. See note 124 supra.
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(a) Antitrust problems created by defensive acquisitions, that is,
acquisitions initiated and made with knowledge of pending tender offers,
should not be regarded as being raised in good faith unless such acquisitions are pursuant to shareholder approval following full disclosure of
the potential tender offer and antitrust implications. Otherwise, target
management may achieve an effective block on the transferability of
shares to the potential acquiror, utilizing antitrust laws in a manner that
controlling shareholders, if given the opportunity, may consider objectionable.
(b) Judicial attention should be directed not simply to alleged antitrust problems, but also to whether any reasonable efforts were made to
seek resolution of such problems. If antitrust concerns represent the most
serious challenge to what may be an otherwise favorable merger, the
directors' good faith in litigating such issues may be questioned where
remedial possibilities are ignored or deliberately avoided. 282
(c) A preliminary injunction against the tender offer may not be the
most appropriate response even where potential antitrust problems are
evident. Judge Friendly's oft-quoted statement in support of preliminary
relief 233 is not a signal for reflex injunctions against tender offers, but
rather was designed to encourage district court judges to frame orders at
an early stage that permit flexibility and accommodation of competing
interests. The "variety of tools" available to courts include permitting the
tender offer to proceed with sufficient safeguards so that potential
divestiture or other remedy may be readily imposed if appropriate. Thus,
temporary limitations upon the absorption or disposal of major assets,
changes in employee and customer practices, and other protective
measures maintain a relative status quo and facilitate a nondisruptive
transition if remedial action is eventually required. 254
232. Judicial cognizance of the use and effects of antitrust claims for defensive purposes is well reflected by the circuit court's statement in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v.
Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974):
[D)rawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained
sheathed in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to
obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the
offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will fail
even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no antitrust
violation has been shown. Such cases require a balancing of public and private
interests of various sorts.
Id. at 854. Accord, Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., Inc., FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 197,806, at 90,048-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
233. Judge Friendly observed:
[D)istrict judges would do well to ponder whether, if a violation has been suffi.
ciently proved on an application for a temporary injunction, the opportunity for
doing equity is not considerably better then than it will be later on. The court
will have a variety of tools useable at that stage.
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir.
1969).
234. See United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196 (N.D.N.Y.
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(d) In cash tender offer situations involving the acquisition of a
substantial percentage of shares, the costs of divestiture and damages
occasioned by antitrust problems will be borne heaviest by the acquiring
company. Although divestiture may create adverse consequences to
target corporate interests such as goodwill, relations with suppliers, and
employee relationships, and preacquisition status quo may be difficult to
completely achieve, the consequences may be remote and of uncertain
extent. Moreover, suppliers and employees of the acquired company may
have adequate insulation against the effects of divestiture by normal contractual processes or leverage.
The foregoing analysis suggests a cautious judicial response to target
management's claims of antitrust violations, and perhaps may have
analogous application to other claimed violations where adequate
judicial relief may be fashioned short of enjoining the tender offer. m
Restricting the impact of this string in the defensive bow would not
create substantial, adverse consequences to shareholders or corporate
interests. Legitimate, nonantitrust concerns of misuse of corporate assets
or of other adverse consequences of control transference may be answer·
able through other forms of litigation and defensive measures. 256

5.

Other Defensive Measures

The preceding discussion has focused upon the defensive techniques
employed by target management that raise, under a sale of control
analogue, substantial questions of legitimacy. Although certain defensive
measures not discussed may also be of doubtful validity, such as accelera ·
tion provisions in loan agreements 257 and the withholding of shareholder
lists, 258 other measures generally do not create serious concern under a
1979), where, after a preliminary injunction barring a tender offer had been denied, Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas., , 62,393, at 76,378, af.fd,
1978-2 Trade Cas., , 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978), the district court issued a Hold Separate
Order requiring United to maintain Carrier "as a separate corporation such that Carrier
will be capable of being divested pursuant to any subsequent decree ... " 466 F. Supp. at
203. Accord, Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 4ll F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
235. One example is the alleged violations of federal shipping and communication
laws in General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), involving relatively minor aspects of the target company. Id. at 750. Although
other grounds in the complaint led to a cumulative effect that caused the court to issue a
preliminary injunction, it would have been unfortunate had the relatively minor and
apparently resolvable shipping and FCC issues been a determinative factor in precluding
the tender offer.
236. Target management may regard litigation, in common with other defensive
measures, as a tactic to force a higher price from the tender offeror if the offer cannot be
defeated. Antitrust litigation, however, is a particularly inappropriate method to achieve
this result, for the antitrust bullet may not be readily shoved back into the barrel even
though target management's opposition to the tender offer may have been dropped. See
Wachtell, supra note 50, at 1437.
237. See note 46 supra.
2!18. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910, 914 (N.D.
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sale of control analogue. For example, a defensive merger with a "white
knight" may be accomplished only pursuant to shareholder approval. 239
Assuming full disclosure of the adverse effect of such a merger upon a
pending tender offer, approval of the merger is equivalent to majority
shareholder rejection of the tender offer. Broad-scale publicity campaigns do not inhibit target shareholder options, are consistent with full
disclosure goals, and may be adequately policed by the disclosure standards of the Williams Act. 240 Reduction in liquidity through increased
cash dividends, premature debt repayments, and other uses of liquid
assets may have relatively little impact as a brake upon a tender offer.
Such measures may actually improve the capitalization structure of the
target company, and in any event, they are governed by standards of
waste and mismanagement that would give directors considerable pause
prior to authorizing extraordinary cash outlays. w Other defensive
techniques have not been evaluated primarily because any effort to
catalogue and comment upon the whole of defensive strategies is doomed
to rather quick obsolescence by the ingenuities of corporate management
and counsel. It may be anticipated, however, that analysis of new
measures as developed will be aided by the sale of control analogue, thus
avoiding the obfuscation of inherently ambiguous or conflicting standards generally in vogue.

6.

Defensive Measures as a Means of Improving the
Offering Price to Shareholders

A more benign attitude is often taken towards management if their
pursuit of aggressive defensive measures is viewed as a method of forcing a
higher bid from the potential acquiror. Indeed, shareholders may often
wind up with higher or competing offers as a result of management's
belligerance. 242 When management believes the offering price to be too
Tex. 1976); Commonwealth Oil v. Tesaro, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 195,081, at 97,815-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
239. Although shareholder approval may not be required for the target corporation
that is the survivor and issues no more than 20% of its shares to its acquired partner, this
form of merger is far less effective a defensive measure than the more common merger of
target corporation into its defensive partner. See, e.g., Broum Group to Acquire Outdoor
Sports in "White Knight" Move Against Rivals, Wall St. J., May 8, 1979, at 12, col. 3.
240. Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mass.), vacated on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975).
241. Personal liability is imposed upon directors who consent to the payment of any
cash dividends in excess of statutory limitations. DEL. CORP. CODE§ 174 (1974). Directors
may also be personally liable for waste of corporate assets determined through derivative
actions. See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
242. Competing offers may develop through negotiated offers by "white knights" or
from unexpected sources aroused to action during the period of delay created by defensive techniques. Even in the absence of competing offers the bids may be raised to meet
objections of inadequacy or to place increased pressure on management. See Kummer&:
Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FINANCE 505, 514
(1978) ("Comparatively speaking, premiums for the resisted tenders ... are significantly
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low, a strenuous publicity campaign is appropriate and perhaps
obligatory. 243 More difficult questions relate to judging when the issue of
price is a bona fide concern and determining which defensive measures
may be justified as a means of augmenting the offering price. Aggressive
defensive measures undertaken unilaterally by target management are an
inappropriate response to the issue of price inadequacy. A market price
viewed by management as unrealistically low may well be the result of
perceived judgments as to management's capabilities. Moreover, a bid
that is in fact inadequate may generate competing bids of higher values,
and the advance notice provisions in numerous state statutes 2H provide a
time frame for competing bids to be formulated. In an era of substantial
merger activity, the absence of competing bids may belie management's
assertions that defensive measures are necessary to avoid inadequate
offers. 245 Morevoer, litigation, and the invoking of regulatory provisions
are high risk methods of adducing a higher offering price, for legal
arguments once raised may not be conveniently ignored when a higher bid
has been obtained.
CONCLUSION

Determining the validity of defensive measures by target management through fiduciary, statutory, or economic perspectives is impeded
by ambiguities and conflicts inherent in those traditional standards.
Efforts to resolve competing claims by reference to macrocosmic theories
have inevitably created conflicting arguments. Judicial response has not
created clarity because opinions tend to confuse distinctions among standards and often fail to address adequately the full implications of particular concepts cited in support of their decisions.
An effort to avoid ideological ambiguities that defy consensus or
greater than the passive tenders."). For discussion regarding the potential adverse effects
of competing tender offers initiated by target management, see note 225 supra.
243. If price inadequacy is based upon nondisclosed material information unknown to
the offeror and target shareholders, rule 10b-5 considerations might require disclosure so
,that shareholders may make informed judgments about the value of the target stock. The
goal of informed decisionmaking by shareholders has been cited as the basis for recom·
mending that the Williams Act be amended to require management communication to
shareholders for all tender offers. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 74, at 938. Management
is currently under no duty to respond to tender offers, Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489,
494 (2d Cir. 1949), subject to disclosure concerns noted above.
244. Delaware, for example, requires a minimum 20 days advance notice to the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(l) (Supp. 1978) .
245. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 18, at 100-01, suggesting that, in light of the proof an "auction" by reason of the delays occasioned by state statutes, "the contenthat management should seriously consider opposing an initial offer in order to
a better price for shareholders is strengthened." No indication is given as to what
"opposing" measures would be appropriate, but presumably the argument does not sugor countenance measures that effectively preclude hostile offers from proceeding
if higher bids are achieved.
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reasonable accommodation, and to view defensive measures in more
direct and realistic terms, is reflected by the sale of control analogue.
The analogue views the tender offer as an effort to achieve a collective
sale of control through the common response of tendering shareholders.
There is no persuasive justification for imposing greater impediments
upon the collective sale of control than are imposed upon a dominant
shareholder's private transference of control shares. Judicial limitations
that have developed to restrain the actions of dominant shareholders are
appropriate guidelines to evaluate restraints upon transferability
imposed by defensive measures. In this context certain measures lack reasonable justification while others may be appropriate only if consistent
with express or implied shareholder consent. Whatever the result of
evaluation, the sale of control analogue is better suited than currently
prevalent rationales to reflect the dynamics of the tender offer context.
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